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Tightened reliability requirements for the electricity distribution are causing distribution system 
operators to improve the quality of supply by renovating the network. To achieve a weather-proof 
distribution network by the end of year 2028, major investments must be made by means of re-
placing overhead lines with cables and increasing the level of automation in the network. Since 
the renovation process is rather slow and expensive, DSOs must obtain cost savings in distribu-
tion network operation by utilizing existing network automation more efficiently. One of the main 
solutions is to automatize the fault management and thereby reduce outage duration experienced 
by the customer.  
Traditional fault management comprises the co-operation of the network control center and 
field crews working along the distribution network. An increasing amount of network automation, 
such as remote-controlled disconnectors, sectionalizing reclosers and fault detectors, is improv-
ing the response time of medium network faults when the operator can isolate the fault remotely 
from the control center. However, multiple simultaneous faults in major electricity disruption can 
cause personnel of the control center to be overburdened with fault handling and dispatching field 
crews. Therefore, automatic Fault Location, Isolation, and supply Restoration (FLIR) functionality 
is considered as a beneficial tool to assist the network operator. While the FLIR performs the first 
steps of fault management, operator is freed to conduct the operation of field crews repairing 
failures.  
MicroSCADA Pro is a product family for electricity distribution control and supervisory by ABB. 
The current version of MicroSCADA Pro DMS600 4.5 already includes functionality for automatic 
fault isolation and supply restoration, but it is not used by any DSOs due to functional imperfec-
tions. The current fault detection, isolation and supply restoration (FDIR) functionality requires an 
exact fault location inferred by fault current measurements or fault indicator operations and there-
fore, it can rarely operate due to lack of initial data. To achieve an efficient operation, a trial 
switching sequence must be introduced as part of the existing functionality. The method of trial 
switching is normally used by the operator when fault cannot be located according to measure-
ments and indications. A basic principle of the trial switchings is to divide faulty feeder into minor 
sections and close the substation circuit breaker against the suspected fault. This is continued 
until the circuit breaker trips and the fault has been located and isolated into a single disconnector 
zone.  
The research for this thesis was carried out by interviews for Finnish DSOs to gather require-
ments and restrictions for the FLIR functionality. The main objective of the interview process was 
to familiarize the fault management process of a network control center operator, so as human-
like operation of the FLIR could be obtained. Interviews gathered the most important development 
needs and possible restrictions to ensure the most fluent operation between automation and the 
network control center operators. For example, automation may not be wanted to restore supply 
from adjacent feeders during major disturbance, since multiple fault can occur and cause also 
backup feeder to trip and increase the faulty area. Automatic functionality should not also disturb 
the operation of network control center, and thus separate fault handling areas should be deter-
mined for FLIR to operate. 
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Tiukentuneet käyttövarmuusvaatimukset sähkönjakeluverkoissa aiheuttavat mittavia investoin-
teja sähköverkonhaltijalle. Saavuttaakseen Sähkömarkkinalain määrittämän säävarman sähkön-
jakeluverkon vuoden 2028 loppuun mennessä, jakeluverkkoa on vahvistettava kaapeloimalla tai 
siirtämällä johto-osuuksia esimerkiksi tien varsille sekä lisäämällä sähköverkon automaatioas-
tetta. Edellä mainitut toimenpiteet ovat kuitenkin kalliita ja hitaita toimenpiteitä, joten säästöjä on 
saavutettava muun muassa keskeytyskustannuksista olemassa olevan automaation tehokkaam-
malla hyödyntämisellä. Automaattisella vianhallinnalla voidaan pienentää keskeytyksestä aiheu-
tuvia kustannuksia sekä työvoimakustannuksia. 
Vianhallinta on tärkeä osa sähköverkon käyttötoimintaa. Tiukentuvat toimitusvarmuusvaati-
mukset vaativat sujuvan vianhallintaprosessin erityisesti haja-asutusalueella toimivalle jakelu-
verkkoyhtiölle, jonka johtolähdöt ovat usein pitkiä ja alttiita sään vaikutuksille. Vianhallinta hoide-
taan käyttökeskuksessa operaattorien toimesta kauko-ohjattavilla kytkinlaitteilla sekä ohjaamalla 
työryhmiä joko erottamaan vika käsikäyttöisellä kytkinlaitteella tai korjaamaan jo paikannettu ja 
erotettu vika. Keskeiset järjestelmät käyttökeskuksen toiminnan kannalta ovat käytönvalvonta- 
(SCADA) sekä käytöntukijärjestelmä (DMS), jotka tarjoavat reaaliaikaista tietoa verkon tilasta ja 
hälytyksistä. Jakeluverkon automaatiota sekä älykkäitä järjestelmiä hyödyntämällä voidaan to-
teuttaa itsenäisesti ohjautuvia toiminnollisuuksia, joista yhtenä esimerkkinä on automaattinen 
vianpaikannus, vianerotus ja jakelunpalautus (FLIR). Suurimmat hyödyt FLIR:n käytöstä saadaan 
tilanteissa, joissa verkon alueella on useita samanaikaisia vikatilanteita tai vika tapahtuu yöaikaan 
ja käyttökeskus on miehittämätön. 
MicroSCADA Pro on ABB:n tuoteperhe, joka käsittää ohjelmistot käytönvalvontaan, käytöntu-
keen sekä verkkotiedon ylläpitämiseen. DMS600-käytöntukijärjestelmän nykyinen versio 4.5 si-
sältää FLIR-toiminnallisuuden, joka ei kuitenkaan tämän työn kirjoittamishetkellä ole käytössä yh-
delläkään verkkoyhtiöllä toiminnallisten puutteiden takia. Tämän hetkinen toteutus vaatii tarkan 
vikapaikan, joka perustuu laskentaan joko vikavirta-, vikaimpedanssi- tai vikaetäisyystiedon ja 
havahtuneiden vikaindikaattorien perusteella. Tämän takia nykytoiminnallisuudella ei voida toimia 
esimerkiksi maasulun tapauksessa, sillä vikavirta on liian pieni laskennalliseen määritykseen. 
Usein ongelmaksi muodostuvat myös epätarkat tai puuttuvat vikavirran arvot sekä vikaindikaat-
torien vähäinen määrä jakeluverkoissa. Nykytoteutuksen FLIR pystyy hoitamaan vain yhden vian 
kerrallaan, mikä edelleen vähentää ominaisuuden hyödynnettävyyttä.  
Työn aikana haastateltiin suomalaisia sähköverkkoyhtiöitä kartoittaen, mitkä ovat vaatimukset 
FLIR:n tehokkaalle toiminnalle. Haastattelujen tarkoituksena oli kuvata mahdollisimman tarkasti 
operaattorin suorittama vianerotus ja jakelunpalautus -prosessi, jota voidaan myöhemmin hyö-
dyntää määritettäessä automaattitoimintoa mahdollisimman lähelle valvomohenkilökunnan mu-
kaista toimintaa. Tarkoituksena oli myös selvittää mahdolliset rajaavat tekijät automaattiselle toi-
minnalle. Esimerkiksi jakelunpalautustoiminto täytyy voida kytkeä pois päältä suurhäiriötilan-
teessa, jossa todennäköisyys vikojen esiintymiseen ensimmäisen vikapaikan takaisella lähtö-
osuudella on suuri. Tällöin varayhteyden käyttäminen saattaa aiheuttaa keskeytyksen myös va-
rayhteyslähdöllä. Automaattinen toiminto ei saa myöskään häiritä operaattorin toimintaa, joten on 
pystyttävä määrittämään rajattu alue, jossa FLIR operoi. Toimintarajoiksi voidaan määrittää laaja 
vianhallinta-alue, sähköasema, lähtö tai joukko toimilaitteita.  
 
 
Avainsanat: FLIR, automaattinen vianpaikannus, vianerotus, jakelunpalautus, SCADA, DMS, 
vianhallinta, jakeluverkon toimitusvarmuus, käytöntukijärjestelmä, MicroSCADA Pro 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Reliable distribution of electricity is the backbone of modern society. After several severe 
major electricity disruptions caused by extreme weather conditions, authorities have 
taken actions to improve the electricity distribution reliability. The current version of Finn-
ish Electricity Market Act, published in year 2013, states that distribution system operator 
(DSO) must ensure a weatherproof electricity distribution network by the end of year 
2028. Therefore, major investments must be made by means of replacing overhead lines 
with cables and improving the distribution automation. These investments are expensive 
and time consuming, so DSOs must obtain cost savings in the distribution network op-
eration. According to the Distribution Network 2030 vision, requirements for the future 
state-of-the-art distribution network are [1]: 
• High reliability distribution not prone to severe weather conditions 
• Cost effective operation with less maintenance and human labor 
• Environmental aspects are considered carefully 
• Flexible distribution system to enable the penetration of distributed generation 
Fault management is one of the key tasks of a distribution system operator. According 
to interruption statistics of the Council of European Energy Regulators, average of 70 to 
80 percent of the outages in the European countries are caused by medium voltage (MV) 
network failures. [2] Therefore, besides traditional reinforcements of the MV network, 
DSOs are seeking opportunities to utilize existing network automation in fault manage-
ment more efficiently. With remote-controlled switching devices, fault indicators and 
more sophisticated microcontroller-based protection relays, it is possible to automatize 
the fault detection, location and isolation process using local automation or utilizing ad-
vanced algorithms of a distribution management system (DMS).  
The main objective for automatic Fault Location, Isolation and supply Restoration (FLIR) 
is to reduce outage costs and support the fault management process of the network 
control center especially in major disturbance situations and during nighttime. In a major 
disturbance situation, multiple simultaneous faults are occurring at the same time result-
ing control center operators to be overburdened with fault handling and managing field 
crews operating all over the distribution network. Thus, operating personnel can maintain 
better awareness of the overall situation and control the workflow more efficiently. Other 
potential benefits of the FLIR functionality can be achieved in un-manned network control 
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centers during nighttime. If fault is occurring at night, automation can shorten the time of 
fault isolation and let the remote-working operator to continue handling the fault.  
Motivation for this thesis was to research development needs for the FLIR functionality 
of ABB MicroSCADA Pro DMS600 distribution management system. There is already 
existing functionality available, but according to customer, it is not feasible enough to be 
used in daily actions. Current fault isolation and restoration feature is dependent on the 
exact location of the fault by fault current measurements or fault indicator operations. 
Fault current measurement is not always available, or fault distance calculation can indi-
cate several suspected fault locations due to branched feeder topologies. Also, current 
fault indicator technology is discovered to be unreliable and thus they are rarely availa-
ble. Fault cannot usually be located and therefore the algorithm is stopped leaving oper-
ator to handle the fault by hand.  
The development needs for the FLIR functionality were gathered by interviews for three 
Finnish distribution operators: Savon Voima Verkko Oy, Kajave Oy, and Koilis-Satakun-
nan Sähkö Oy. The main objective of the study was to acquire knowledge of the fault 
isolation and supply restoration process carried out by the network control center oper-
ator and find key functionalities or restrictions for the FLIR application. Study was carried 
out with semi-structured interviews, which included open questionnaire sent for the DSO 
representatives in advance. The semi-structured interview method was selected to get 
the most comprehensive view and new ideas for the fault management functions. Inter-
view also included methods for improving the distribution reliability and expectations of 
the benefits of the automatic functionalities. After the interview process, development 
ideas were presented, and additional information was gathered in the FLIR workshop 
during MicroSCADA Pro User Event. 
The first part of this thesis consists of a literature review describing the Finnish distribu-
tion system along with a concept of distribution automation and regulation methods ac-
cording to the fault management. General fault management is introduced from the net-
work control center point of view, and the concept is supplemented with automatic func-
tionalities. Also, benefits and challenges of currently increasing distributed energy re-
sources are described briefly. MicroSCADA Pro product family is introduced focusing on 
the fault management functionalities of the DMS600 Workstation. The second part of this 
thesis comprises the most important features for the FLIR according to the DSO inter-
views. Development needs are summarized in a functional requirements document, and 
proposed features are analyzed according to the literature review and existing features 
of DMS600 to support the implementation of the FLIR functionality.  
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2. DISTRIBUTION AUTOMATION 
The concept of distribution automation (DA) consists of an entity of devices used to con-
trol, plan, and monitor the distribution network remotely or automatically. Automation im-
proves the reliability and usability of the distribution network and decreases the opera-
tional costs. Distribution automation provides the possibility to achieve automatic func-
tionalities, such as automatic fault management and automatic voltage control. [3] Since 
the main objective of the thesis is to represent automatic fault handling methods, intro-
duction to the DA concept is necessary. The comprehensive distribution automation con-
cept can be presented with a hierarchical structure from a distribution company to a cus-
tomer level, as illustrated in the Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1.  The hierarchy of distribution automation adapted from [3] 
Each of the automation levels has different tasks and functions. Company level functions 
are focused on the administration and utilization of the information provided by various 
information systems, such as NIS, CIS, DMS, and SCADA. The main tasks at company 
level are e.g. management of network information and customer information databases, 
switching planning for maintenance outages, and planning of backup connections. The 
network control center (NCC) level automation is based on utilization of DMS and 
SCADA systems to monitor and control the distribution system in real time. In the outage 
situation, planning and switching actions as well as customer service and field crew man-
agement are carried out by the operational personnel of the NCC. Substation level is 
comprised of controlling the switching devices, operation of protection relays, and vari-
ous types of measurements. Substation automation also includes e.g. control of the com-
pensation devices and the primary transformer tap changers. Substation may also have 
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an option of using SCADA locally if remote use from NCC is not available. Network au-
tomation includes the operation of remote-controlled switching devices, fault indicators, 
and measurements along the feeder. One of the key functions of the network automation 
is to decrease duration and extent of the distribution network outages. The customer 
automation includes the automatic meter reading (AMR) and tariff control. [4] The smart 
grid concept enables more advanced customer automation systems e.g. for handling the 
increasing penetration of distributed energy resources (DER) [5]. 
2.1 Electricity distribution system 
The electricity distribution system consists of a primary process and a secondary pro-
cess. The primary process includes network equipment such as transformers, distribu-
tion lines, switching devices, and compensation devices, while the secondary process 
comprises the devices used to monitor and control the primary process. Intelligent Elec-
tronic Device (IED) is the common expression for the secondary process devices, such 
as protection relays, fault detectors, and the primary equipment controllers. [3] The pri-
mary and the secondary processes of the distribution system are presented in the Figure 
2.  
 
Figure 2. The electricity distribution system with primary and secondary processes 
explained. Adapted from [3] 
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The primary process of the distribution system can be divided into high voltage (HV), 
medium voltage (MV), and low voltage (LV) networks according to the voltage level. The 
high voltage distribution network is typically considered as 110 kV sub-transmission net-
work operated by regional network operators (RNO). The voltage level of the MV network 
is typically 20 kV, but also other voltage levels are used, mostly in urban networks for 
historical reasons. The LV network consists of 0.4 kV lines connecting customers to the 
distribution substations, but 1 kV distribution network has also become more common in 
rural areas to partially replace 20 kV medium voltage branches. [4] 
 In the aspect of fault management, the medium voltage network can be considered as 
the most critical part, because of about 70 to 80 % of outages experienced by customers 
are originated from faults in MV network. [2] The medium voltage network is mostly built 
as meshed but used in normal operating conditions as radial feeders having open points 
for possible backup connections. Radial operation is beneficial because of the more 
straightforward process of network protection and operation. Ring operated MV networks 
are becoming more common, especially in the urban distribution networks due to more 
advanced protection systems and increasing amount of network automation. [4] 
An increasing amount of distributed generation (DG) is also affecting to the nature of the 
distribution network. Traditionally electricity generation is centralized in the power plants 
connected to the transmission network causing unidirectional power flow from the pri-
mary substation towards customers. Due to DG connected into MV and LV networks, 
the nature of the MV network topology has changed more like meshed, having bidirec-
tional power flows and multiple sources of fault current. These conditions brought new 
challenges for the network protection and voltage control, but also possibilities e.g. micro 
grid operation during major disturbance situations. [6] 
2.2 Network Control Center automation 
Control and monitoring of the distribution system are managed from the Network Control 
Center (NCC). Due to critical functions in distribution network operation, the NCC is usu-
ally equipped with Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS) to ensure operation during a ma-
jor disturbance. Network Control Center can be in one centralized location or multiple 
NCCs can exist to be responsible of a certain area of the distribution network or to act 
as a backup NCC in case of disruption of the primary NCC. Definition of the network 
control center can consist also so-called mobile NCC, where the operation of the network 
is performed from the laptop computer carried by the operator on duty. The main tasks 
of the NCC are: [4]  
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• Network control and state monitoring 
• Fault management and reporting 
• Maintenance planning and management 
• Switching planning 
• Customer support and information 
The importance of the NCC is emphasized during a major disturbance situation. With 
well-organized and automated operations, increased number of faults can be managed, 
and number of customers resupplied. Network control center is responsible also for the 
electrical safety of the maintenance personnel working in the field. Therefore, all the 
switching actions in the medium voltage network must be confirmed by the network con-
trol center operator. [7] 
2.2.1 Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition 
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition system is an information system used for real-
time control and monitoring of a distribution system. It communicates with substation and 
network automation equipment via remote terminal units (RTU) and gathers information 
about the state of the distribution network as well as provides controllability of e.g. circuit 
breakers and remote-controlled disconnectors (RCD). According to [4], main functions 
of the SCADA system are: 
• Management of the event data 
• Management of the network switching state 
• Remote control 
• Remote measuring 
• Remote configuration 
• Reporting 
Event data management provides information about operation of protection relays, 
switching device state changes, and fault detector operations. Combining event data with 
network model, it is possible to maintain switching state of the distribution network in the 
system. The process database of SCADA includes accurate information only on primary 
substations and substation devices, while the distribution network is usually presented 
as a simplified schematic view, including connections between primary substations and 
remote-controlled switching devices. [3] Process display of the SCADA system is pre-
sented in the Figure 3. 
7 
 
 
Figure 3.  Process display of the SCADA system 
The information of the switching state is critical for a safe distribution network operation. 
Therefore, SCADA systems are redundant having replicated applications on separate 
computers and backed up communications. In case of a system failure in the primary 
computer, the secondary computer takes the SCADA in control. These computers are 
also equipped with UPS devices to enable uninterrupted operation during outages. [8] 
2.2.2 Distribution management system 
Distribution management system is an IT system, which consists of applications to sup-
port the distribution network operation. While the SCADA system is designed to gather 
data and transmit control commands, distribution management system utilizes and ana-
lyzes data from several information systems such as SCADA, the network information 
system (NIS) and the customer information system (CIS). Usually the network model is 
presented in geographical view with a background map, which enables easier under-
standing of the network locations and e.g. a real-time field crew presentation on the map. 
[9] Example of the geographical network view is presented in the Figure 4.  
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Figure 4. Graphical network presentation of the DMS system  
With precise technical data of the network combined to the real-time information received 
from the SCADA, DMS can perform on-line analyses and calculations to assist the net-
work operator. Main functionalities of the DMS are [4]: 
• Topology management 
• Switching state management 
• Network and protection analysis 
• Outage management 
• Operations planning 
• Reporting 
• Customer service 
DMS performs continuous or scheduled network and protection analysis to support op-
erator’s decision-making or to provide initial data for automatic functions, such as auto-
matic switching planning. Load flow of the network is calculated using customer group 
specific load curves in order to estimate voltages in network nodes. The estimation val-
ues are then readjusted based on the real-time measurements from the substation to 
achieve values that are more accurate. [9] In automatic fault isolation and service resto-
ration, real-time load flow calculation is used for checking reserve connection capability, 
as possible voltage violations and thermal limits of the line sections are checked. From 
the fault management point of view, other important DMS function is the network protec-
tion analysis. Protection analysis ensures that both the short circuit protection and the 
earth fault protection are functioning properly. If the automatic supply restoration algo-
rithm detects violation in operation limits of the relay protection, backup connection can-
not be used. [10] 
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Fault management of the distribution management system comprises of fault handling 
function which lists and prioritizes unrepaired faults with fault information received from 
the SCADA. The NCC operator can examine the faulty feeder and the calculated fault 
locations from the graphical network view. [11] Based on the automatic switching plan-
ning, DMS may provide assisting switching sequences for fault isolation and supply res-
toration. After the fault has been repaired, reporting of the fault is assisted with a partially 
filled fault report form. The operator is left to correct the prefilled report and archive the 
fault report. [4] 
Typical fault management of the DMS system also includes customer service function-
alities, such as a web-based outage map, outage information and an automatic tele-
phone answering machine (TAM) [12]. However, interactive mobile applications and 
SMS messages are mostly replacing the old TAM functionality, since customers must be 
provided with real-time information of the outage situation [7]. Real-time fault information 
can also be provided to field crews operating among the distribution area. While the 
locations and contact information of the field crews are shown in the network presenta-
tion, the NCC operator can dispatch them more efficiently. [13] 
2.3 Substation automation 
Substation automation can be divided into device level and station level automation. De-
vice level automation includes e.g. operations of protection relays, controls of switching 
devices, voltage and current measurements, and regulation of voltage with a tap changer 
of the primary transformer. Station level automation consists of the local controlling of 
the substation, remote control communications, and sequence controls, for example to 
disconnect another primary transformer for maintenance. [4] Secondary process equip-
ment and communications in the substation automation are presented in Figure 5. 
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Figure 5.  Substation automation equipment and communication. Adapted from 
[14]. 
Modern substation automation concept includes feeder terminals that consist of micro-
controller-based protection relays, measurements, and disturbance recorders in the 
same physical device. In case of a fault, the feeder terminal disconnects the supply by 
opening the circuit breaker, if the fault current magnitude exceeds the setting values of 
the relay. It also sends measurements, alarms, event data, and disturbance recordings 
to the SCADA system to locate the fault and analyze the disturbance situation. Commu-
nications from feeder terminals as well as other control and measurement devices are 
transmitted to the SCADA via communications concentrator as presented in the Figure 
5. [8] 
Distribution automation devices communicate to the upper level systems via Remote 
Terminal Units (RTU). The RTU gathers data from the network equipment and transmits 
it to the SCADA. In addition, control commands and setting values are transmitted from 
the SCADA to the substation automation equipment via RTUs. [15] Since the substation 
automation is critical part of the distribution network operation, communication is in most 
cases hardwired with optical fiber, or in old applications with copper wires. Communica-
tion links are also duplicated to ensure reliable operation in case of equipment malfunc-
tions. [4] 
 
 
11 
 
2.4 Network automation 
Besides automation in substations, there is also automation located along the distribution 
network. The network automation consists of remote controllable switching devices, such 
as remote-controlled disconnectors (RCD) and reclosers, and fault detectors. Nowadays, 
most of the network automation is located in the medium voltage network and secondary 
substations, but automation in the low voltage network is becoming more general. [14] 
Remote controllable disconnectors reduce the interruption time experienced by the cus-
tomer, since the network operator can isolate the fault directly from the NCC. In addition, 
RCDs reduce the human labor costs and allow automatic fault handling applications. To 
achieve the most cost-efficient operation of the network, remote-controllable discon-
nector stations are installed in the tie points and the most important branches of the MV 
network. Although the interruption duration is reduced, RCDs do not have an effect on 
the interruption amount experienced by the customer. To also reduce the interruption 
frequency, remote-controlled reclosers, also called sectionalizing circuit breakers, can 
be applied along the MV network. The recloser divides the feeder into independent pro-
tection zones. Therefore, fault occurring on a line section after the recloser zone before 
the recloser is not affected by the fault. This is especially beneficial on the long rural 
feeders that are prone to weather-related faults. [16] Location of the recloser on a long 
rural feeder is presented in the Figure 6.  
 
Figure 6. Remote recloser on a long rural feeder 
Other crucial parts of the efficient fault location are fault detectors, which operate when 
the fault current passes by. Modern fault detector units can detect both short circuit and 
earth faults. While the short circuit operation is based on the overcurrent detection, the 
earth fault detection methods depend on the grounding type of the network. In neutral-
12 
 
isolated or compensated networks, the earth fault detection is based on the zero-se-
quence current measurement or on monitoring the direction of zero sequence voltage 
and current. Fault detectors can be divided into remote readable devices, which provide 
information for the SCADA and DMS, or locally readable devices that require a field crew 
to inspect them on site. [12] The basic principles of the regular and the directional fault 
detectors are presented in the Figure 7. 
 
Figure 7.  Principle of the fault detector operation. Adapted from [17, 18] 
There have been reliability issues with the fault detectors, especially in the earth fault 
detection. In the neutral-isolated networks, the fault current fed by other feeders can 
cause a false operation of the detectors located in the healthy feeder or behind the fault. 
Also, a lightning strike can cause false operation of the fault detectors. Due to reliability 
issues, fault detectors have not been widely used by the DSOs. However, some DSOs 
are carrying out pilot projects to apply fault detectors in the network to experiment with 
the reliability and usefulness of the modern applications. [19] From the fault location point 
of view, equipping remote readable fault detectors widely enough would remarkably 
speed up the process and reduce undesirable trial switching.  
2.5 Communication infrastructure 
Increasing number of automation devices in the distribution system sets requirements 
for a reliable communication infrastructure. Communication technology varies between 
different kind of network applications based on its criticality, cost-efficiency, and distance 
between communicating units. For example, data flow between a protection relay is time-
critical and therefore communication method must be fast enough and secured with a 
backup connection. On the other hand, e.g. communication for customer meter reading 
13 
 
can be implemented with slower PLC or radio link communications. [4] Most common 
communication technologies used by DSOs are:  
• Optical fiber and copper cable 
• Radio link 
• Mobile network (3G, 4G, GSM, GPRS) 
• PLC (Power Line Carrier) 
• Satellite network 
Installation of physical connection, such as optical fiber and copper cables, is often an 
expensive and challenging process, especially with long distances. Therefore, these are 
only used in primary substation communication due to their high capacity and reliability. 
Network and secondary substation automation instead are usually communicating with 
radio link or mobile network. Due to an increasing amount of automation devices, old 
fashioned radio link and mobile networks are becoming bottlenecks in the two-way com-
munication requirements in the smart grid concept. Hence, 3G and 4G mobile networks, 
capable of over 100 Mbit/s data rates, are replacing the old communication standards. 
On the other hand, new generation mobile technologies require more base stations to 
achieve the range of older technologies, which can be a limitation in some rural areas. 
[20] 
Due to the high reliability requirements, usually less capable old technology, such as 
GSM and GPRS mobile networks, radio links, and satellite network, are used as the 
secondary backup communication. For example, in the major disturbance situation, high 
number of 3G and 4G base stations can be unsupplied, disabling the mobile network in 
some areas. Usually base stations are equipped with backup batteries, which still are 
made to sustain the power for only couple of hours. [7] To ensure the distribution network 
operation during a major disturbance, one of the operator’s high priorities is to re-ener-
gize these base stations.  
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3. FAULT MANAGEMENT IN MEDIUM VOLTAGE 
NETWORK 
Efficient fault management is one of the main objectives for the operation of distribution 
network. By reducing the extent or the total duration of faults, distribution system opera-
tors can create cost savings in reduced standard compensations or by improved quality 
incentive of the regulation model of the Energy Authority. In addition, the Electricity Mar-
ket Act defines the reliability requirements for the duration of outages. [21] The act states 
that: 
“2) a failure of the distribution network due to a storm or snow load may not cause an 
outage longer than 6 hours in a town plan area: 
3) a failure of the distribution network due to a storm or snow load may not cause an 
outage longer than 36 hours outside of the town plan area”.  
The DSO must fulfill the reliability requirements during a transition period by the end of 
the year 2028. However, there are exceptions in the enforcement date for distribution 
system operators that should renovate significant amount of the distribution network be-
fore the lifetime of the components, or the demand of cabling exceeds the calculated 
average cabling rate for Finnish distribution system operators. [21]  
According to the standard SFS-EN-50160, the definition of an outage is a condition 
where the voltage at the supply point is less than 5 % of the nominal voltage. Type of the 
outage can be divided into planned outages and unexpected outages, as described in 
the Figure 8. The planned outage is a result of e.g. maintenance in the distribution net-
work and affected customers are informed in advance. The unexpected outage is caused 
by a permanent or transient fault due to external factors, equipment failures, or incorrect 
switching actions. The unexpected outages in the electricity networks are categorized as 
short outages, having the outage duration of 3 minutes or less, or long outages in which 
duration exceeds 3 minutes. [4] 
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Figure 8.  Outage types in the distribution network adapted from [20] 
Temporary outages are typically cleared by the auto-reclosing sequence that consists of 
a rapid auto-reclosing (RAR) and delayed auto-reclosing (DAR). In the rapid auto-reclos-
ing, supply is automatically restored under a one second time span to clear transient 
faults caused by e.g. lightning strike. If the fault is not cleared with the RAR, delayed 
auto-reclosing is applied, in which unsupplied time is longer, approximately one minute. 
During the DAR dead time e.g. arch caused by a tree branch can be extinguished. Fault 
is considered as permanent if the circuit breaker trips after the reclosing sequence, but 
the operator may still perform trial switching after, if fault is expected to be cleared. For 
example, in the urban network, auto-reclosing scheme may not be used due to thermal 
stress caused to underground cables. [4] 
3.1 Regulatory incentives in fault management 
Electricity distribution business being a natural monopoly, operation of the DSO must be 
regulated by the Energy Authority. The main objectives of the regulation model are to 
ensure high quality and reasonable pricing in the electricity distribution. The regulation 
model, presented in the Figure 9, is based on the deficit or surplus resulted from the 
difference between calculated reasonable return and adjusted realized profit of the dis-
tribution system operator. Therefore, the DSO is obligated to either refund the surplus to 
the customers by lowering the network fees and by developing the network or allowed to 
equalize the deficit by raising the network fees. [22] While the regulation model consists 
of several different variables, the most important factors, from the fault management 
point of view, are quality and efficiency incentives. 
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Figure 9.  The Finnish electricity distribution regulation method with highlighted 
quality and efficiency incentives. [22] 
The quality incentive encourages the DSO to improve the quality and reliability of the 
electricity distribution. The distribution reliability must exceed at least the minimum level 
defined by the Electricity Market Act, but a spontaneous enhancement of the reliability 
level benefits the DSO by decreasing the realized adjusted profit. The quality incentive 
is determined by comparing the total regulatory outage costs (KAH) of the inspection 
year to the reference level, which is calculated as an average outage costs of the two 
pervious four-year regulatory period. To even the peak values, the quality incentive in-
cludes maximum and minimum limits for the comparison degree. Thereby, outage costs 
exceeding these limits do not have an effect on the realized adjusted profit. Also, the 
quality incentive is adjusted to have maximum impact of 15 % in realized adjusted profit 
calculation. [22] 
The efficiency incentive encourages the DSO to operate more cost-efficiently. Opera-
tion of the DSO is considered as cost-effective when the operational costs are small 
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enough compared to the operational results. The total outage costs of the efficiency in-
centive comprise the cost caused by outages and the cost caused by preventing the 
outages. According to Energy Authority, these outage costs are modelled as an undesir-
able output variable rather than ordinary output variables. The automatic fault manage-
ment is beneficial for improving the efficiency incentive since it lowers the amount of 
human labor enhancing the operational costs as well as reducing the costs caused by 
outages.  [22] 
Regulatory outage costs comprise the number and duration of unexpected and 
planned outages and the number of rapid and delayed auto-reclosings. The unit prices 
of the KAH parameters, presented in the 0, are valued according to the study conducted 
by Tampere University of Technology and Helsinki University of Technology in 2005. 
Values are calculated averages of the inquiry results from the different customer types 
of the DSOs all around Finland. [23] 
Table 1.  Regulatory outage cost unit prices according to money value in year 2005. 
Adapted from [23] 
Unexpected  
outage 
Planned  
outage 
Rapid  
auto-reclosing 
Delayed  
auto-reclosing 
hE,unexp hW,unexp hE,plan hE,plan hRAR hDAR 
€ / kWh € / kW € / kWh € / kW € / kW € / kW 
11.0 1.1 6.8 0.5 1.1 0.55 
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The total annual KAH costs are calculated using Equation 3.1.  
𝐾𝐴𝐻𝑡,𝑘 =  (
𝐾𝐴𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑥𝑝,𝑡  × ℎ𝐸,𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑥𝑝 +  𝐾𝑀𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑥𝑝,𝑡  ×  ℎ𝑊,𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑥𝑝 + 
 𝐾𝐴𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑛,𝑡 ×  ℎ𝐸,𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑛  + 𝐾𝑀𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑛,𝑡  ×  ℎ𝑊,𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑛  +
𝑅𝐴𝑅𝑡  ×  ℎ𝑅𝐴𝑅 + 𝐷𝐴𝑅𝑡  × ℎ𝐷𝐴𝑅
) × 
𝑊𝑡
𝑇𝑡
 × 
𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑘
𝐶𝑃𝐼2005
 , (3.1) 
where 
KAHt,k  = regulatory outage costs in year t in value of money for year k, [€] 
KAt = total outage duration in the MV distribution network, weighted by annual 
energies, [hrs] 
KMt = total outage number in the MV distribution network, weighted by annual 
energies, [pcs] 
RARt = total outage number caused by rapid auto-reclosings in MV distribution 
network, weighted by annual energies, [pcs] 
DARt = total outage number caused by delayed auto-reclosings in MV distribu-
tion network, weighted by annual energies, [pcs] 
Wt = total distributed energy in year t, [kWh] 
Tt = number of hours in year t, [hrs] 
CPIk = consumer price index in year k 
CPI2005 = consumer price index in year 2005 
 
3.2 Electricity distribution reliability indices 
The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) defines the international in-
dices for electricity distribution reliability in the standard IEEE 1366-2012. These indices 
are categorized into sustained interruption indices, momentary interruption indices, load 
based indices and major power disruption indices. [24]  This chapter introduces the most 
common IEEE reliability indices used in Finnish distribution system. Reporting of the 
IEEE reliability indices are not required by the Energy Authority, but they provide useful 
measure of the distribution system reliability for the DSO’s internal use.  
SAIFI (System Average Interruption Frequency Index) indicates how often the average 
customer is affected by the sustained interruption over a defined time period [24]. The 
index is used for inspection of the line sections prone to faults. By these means DSO can 
allocate the network reinforcements to the right feeders and line sections more optimally. 
The SAIFI is calculated using the equation [24] (3.2.):  
𝑆𝐴𝐼𝐹𝐼 =  
Σ𝑁𝑖
𝑁𝑡
=  
𝐶𝐼
𝑁𝑡
,      (3.2) 
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where  
  Ni = Number of interrupted customers for sustained interruption i during the 
time period t 
  Nt = Total number of customers served 
  CI = Total number of customers interrupted 
SAIDI (System Average Interruption Duration Index) indicates the average total duration 
of interruption for the customer during a defined time period [24]. The index is commonly 
used for reduction of the outage durations. Thus, DSO can optimize the placement of 
remote-controlled switching devices or analyze the benefits of the fault isolation and res-
toration process. The SAIDI can be calculated using equation [24] (3.3): 
𝑆𝐴𝐼𝐷𝐼 =  
Σ𝑟𝑖𝑁𝑖
𝑁𝑡
=  
𝐶𝑀𝐼
𝑁𝑡
,     (3.3) 
where 
  ri = Duration of the outage i in the time period t  
  CMI = Total customer minutes of interruption 
CAIDI (Customer Average Interruption Duration Index) indicated the average time re-
quired to restore supply. The DSO can use this index to analyze and enhance the effec-
tiveness of the fault management process. CAIDI can be calculated using SAIFI and 
SAIDI indices according to equation (3.4). [24] 
𝐶𝐴𝐼𝐷𝐼 =  
Σ𝑟𝑖𝑁𝑖
𝑁𝑖
=  
SAIDI
𝑆𝐴𝐼𝐹𝐼
 ,     (3.4) 
Distribution system operators also use approximate indices based on the interruptions 
affected on the secondary substation. In this way, only the medium voltage network faults 
are considered, and customer information is not taken into account. Secondary substa-
tion level indices are presented as T-SAIDI, T-SAIFI and T-CAIDI. Calculation of these 
indices are conducted as a same manner as in equations 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4, but number 
of customers are replaced with number of secondary substations. [25] 
Other commonly used reliability indices are MAIFI (Momentary Average Interruption Fre-
quency Index), which can be calculated like SAIFI for short outages cleared by auto-
reclosings, and ASAI (Average Services Availability Index) representing the percentage 
of time customer has received power during the defined study period. CELID (Customer 
Experiencing Long Interruption Durations) index is used to indicate the ratio of individual 
customers experiencing interruption durations longer than a defined threshold limit. [24] 
Thereby, the DSO can point out areas which do not meet the outage duration require-
ments set by the Electricity Market Act.  
20 
 
3.3 Faults in the MV network 
Fault types in the electricity network can be divided roughly into short-circuit and earth 
faults. Since the Finnish medium voltage network is used as neutral isolated or resonant 
earthed with a Petersen coil, characteristics of the earth fault differs from the short-circuit 
fault. Therefore, different type of protection and fault location methods must be applied. 
[4] While short-circuit faults can be detected with current measurements due to high 
magnitude fault currents, earth faults need the monitoring of a neutral voltage and current 
or advanced applications, such as admittance-based protection units. [26] 
Most of the permanent faults in the MV network are caused by weather-related issues, 
such as lightning strikes, strong winds, and heavy snow loads. Other causes of the faults 
are e.g. animals, human error or vandalism, and component breakdown due to ageing. 
Figure 10 illustrates the causes of the MV network faults in different types of Finnish 
distribution networks in year 2017. Statistics show that the rural distribution network is 
more prone to faults than the urban network. Majority of the rural distribution network 
faults are a result from long overhead line feeders exposed to the severe weather con-
ditions and wild animals. [27] Strong winds and heavy snow loads cause trees or tree 
branches to fall over the distribution lines, but also damage the network structure itself. 
Especially the support structure of the overhead line poles or even the conductor can 
break down due to stress caused by the heavy snow. Rural networks typically include 
also plenty of aged components that increase the possibility of a component failure.  
 
Figure 10.  Average interruption time caused by unexpected outages adjusted 
by the number of customers in year 2017. Adapted from [27] 
Instead of the environmental causes, urban distribution network faults are typically 
caused by human error or vandalism and component failures. A typical human error re-
lated issue is underground cable damage caused by excavation work. Therefore, it is 
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important to maintain precise information of the cable routes and depths in the network 
information system and use cable detectors to locate the cables before excavation. As 
seen in Figure 10, number of outages is also remarkably smaller than in rural networks. 
Despite of the smaller number of faults, duration of the repair work of a single fault may 
take longer time due to most of the network consisting of underground cables. Single 
fault in urban network can also cause harm to a greater number of customers or even 
lead to major power disruption. Therefore, the scope of the urban fault management is 
more focused on prevention of the faults than preparation for the major disturbance sit-
uations. [28] 
3.3.1 Short circuit faults 
Two or more phase conductors connected directly with an arc or through a fault imped-
ance cause a short circuit fault. The situation is usually caused by a fallen tree branch 
on the overhead line or a broken insulation. The most common types of short circuit faults 
are 2-phase and 3-phase short circuit. Detection of the short circuit is rather simple be-
cause of high magnitude of the fault current, which is typically greater than the load cur-
rent. Due to the high fault current, short circuit faults require rapid clearing to prevent 
exceeding thermal withstand capacity of conductors and network equipment. Rapid 
clearing is also necessary due to voltage dip caused by the three-phase short circuit. 
When this occurs near the substation, voltage dip affects all the customers fed by the 
substation. [4] 
On the protection point of view, it is necessary to define the highest 3-phase short circuit 
current to ensure the withstand capacity of the conductors. Typically, fault current is ap-
proximately 5-12 kA when the 3-phase short circuit occurs in the busbar of the primary 
substation. As the distance of the fault and the substation increases, the fault current is 
decreased by the effect of the conductor impedance. Therefore, 2-phase short circuit 
fault at the end of the long feeder can be so low that the protection relay is not operating. 
When the load current of the feeder is high, network reinforcements may be needed to 
ensure selective and reliable operation of the feeder protection. [4] 
3.3.2 Earth faults 
An earth fault occurs when the live part of the network has conductive contact to earth. 
The earth fault may develop in a network part having protective earthing, such as over 
voltage protection spark gap, or in an unearthed part of the network by e.g. tree leaning 
against the overhead line conductor. [29] Majority of the earth faults in an overhead line 
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network are caused by fallen trees due to severe weather conditions, such as strong 
wind or heavy snow loads. On the contrary, earth faults in an underground cable network 
are usually caused by material ageing failures or excavation work. While the frequency 
of faults is much lower in cabled networks than in overhead line networks, duration of 
the interruption is often longer due to a more difficult locating and repair process. [30] 
The earth fault current in Finnish MV networks is low due to neutral isolated operation 
and unfavorable earthing conditions of the soil. Therefore, detection of an earth fault 
cannot be based on the magnitude of the fault current but monitoring of a zero-sequence 
voltage must be introduced. [29] Due to compensation, earth faults in cabled networks 
have often an intermittent characteristic, which means that fault self-extinguishes and re-
ignites rapidly. When the fault currents of the compensated system are relatively low, 
and conductor does not have a solid earth contact due to partially damaged insulation, 
fault will be extinguished immediately after the breakdown. Due to reduced insulation 
capacity, cable will break down after the voltage of the faulty phase rises. [31] These 
kinds of faults are hard to detect and often require more sophisticated methods, such as 
analysis of frequency, harmonics, and transients. Modern protection relays can be 
equipped with multi-frequency admittance-based functionalities that can also detect the 
intermittent earth faults. [26] 
Although earth fault currents and touch voltages can be limited due to compensated or 
neutral-isolated nature of the medium voltage networks, voltage in the healthy phases 
can rise to magnitudes as high as phase-to-phase voltage. Therefore, recurring earth 
faults can cause overvoltage which may become dangerous for customers or cause 
damage to the network devices and insulation. Overvoltage can also cause single-phase 
earth fault to develop into cross-country earth fault, in which another earth fault occurs 
in the second network location. In cross-country fault, the fault current is usually high and 
due to poor soil conductivity, currents go through well conducting routes, such as com-
munication cables and drainpipes, causing thermal damage. [30]  
A high impedance earth fault occurs when e.g. a tree is leaning over the covered over-
head line or a fallen overhead line on the load side. Due to the high impedance of the 
fault, the fault current and touch voltage are usually low. Because of the low magnitude 
of the fault current, earth fault protection may not isolate the fault, but instead set an 
alarm to indicate possible fault to the operator. In some cases, even the alarm is not 
functioning, and the information of the fault is received from the customer notification. [4]  
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3.4 Major power disruption 
A major power disruption occurs when extreme weather conditions or other incidents, 
such as human errors or vandalism, cause a widely spread and long-lasting interruption 
in the electricity supply. The IEEE Standard defines the major power disruption as Major 
Event that exceeds reasonable design and operational limits of the power system. The 
Major Event includes at least one Major Event Day (MED) in which System Average 
Interruption Duration Index (SAIDI) exceeds a MED threshold value. There is also a def-
inition by Finnish researchers that defines the major power disruption as a condition 
where more than 20 % of customers are without electricity or there is a several hour long 
fault in the 110 kV line, the 110/20 kV primary substation, or the primary transformer. 
[32] 
Major power disruptions caused by severe weather conditions have caused massive 
outage costs to the rural DSOs, as long overhead lines located in the forest are prone to 
fallen or bent trees caused by strong winds and heavy snow loads. Due to challenging 
weather conditions as well as multiple simultaneous faults in widespread distribution net-
work, restoration of the electricity supply can take several days for certain customers. 
The most severe power disruptions in the past decade has been Tapani and Hannu 
storms in December 2011 causing outages to over 500 0000 customers in Finland. [7] 
These situations lead authorities to enact a new Electricity Market Act in 2013 that in-
cludes e.g. maximum outage durations and standard compensations for the customer.  
To achieve proficient operation during a major power disruption, DSOs usually have a 
trained emergency organization, which also includes representatives from local authori-
ties. Through co-operation of different parties, it is possible to ensure better situation 
awareness from the early stages of the disruption to the full clearance of the faults. [33] 
By automatizing certain procedures, such as outage notification, fault prioritization, loca-
tion and isolation, in fault handling, operative personnel of the DSO are freed to conduct 
the overall situation. The situation awareness communication flow between different par-
ties is presented in the Figure 11. 
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Figure 11. Data flow in the situation awareness system. Adapted from [7, 33] 
Publication [33] presents a dedicated Situation Awareness system that combines infor-
mation of the distribution network, mobile networks, weather forecasts, traffic infor-
mation, and status of the critical customers. By these means, the DSO can predict the 
upcoming state of the disturbance and conduct the operation in the field. Monitoring and 
forecasting the status of the mobile network base stations exposes the possible commu-
nication failures of the remote-controlled equipment. Thereby, the operator may prioritize 
the supply restoration or send back up power supply to keep the communications alive.  
3.5 Fault management process 
Fault management process starts with a detection of a fault. In case of a circuit breaker 
tripping, faulty feeder is isolated automatically, and fault information is sent from relay to 
the SCADA. The fault information is then received to DMS via SCADA interface. With a 
graphical topology presentation, the NCC operator can identify the faulty feeder and es-
timate the possible fault location based on heuristic knowledge or calculated fault dis-
tance from fault current measurement. Information of the fault location can also be re-
ceived from a customer call. [12] In case of a high impedance earth fault, protection relay 
may not even detect the fault and the whole fault management process starts from the 
customer informing the fault. Figure 12 illustrates the common process flow of the fault 
management process in the medium voltage network.  
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Figure 12.  Diagram of a conventional fault management process. Adapted 
from [19] 
After a coarse estimate of the faulted line section, the fault is tried to isolate using remote 
controlled disconnectors if they are available in the faulty feeder. When there is no exact 
fault location available, trial switching method is used to locate and isolate the fault. In 
trial switching procedure, operator opens one or more disconnectors along the faulty 
feeder and closes the circuit breaker at the substation against the possible fault. If circuit 
breaker trips, fault is located at the downstream part of the open disconnector. There are 
two common models to perform the trial switching: a bi-section and a zone-by-zone roll-
ing method. [12] More specific details of these methods are introduced in chapter 4.1.3.  
A field crews are dispatched to manually isolate the fault after the remote isolation. If the 
faulty line section is still unknown, the field crew can perform further trial switchings in 
co-operation with the operator. Electricity supply is restored to as many customers as 
possible after the isolation to minimize outage costs. Network and protection calculation 
of the DMS is used to check possible constraint violations when determining the possible 
backup connections. After the faulty zone has been isolated to the desired extent and 
supply partially restored, the field crew can start the repair work.  
It is highly important to ensure the electrical safety when field crew is working at the 
distribution network. According to standard SFS 6002 ‘Safety at electrical work’, the op-
erator is responsible for a safe operation in the field. Therefore, all medium voltage 
switching operations must be approved and a field crew must be granted with a work 
permit by the operator. Also, a person responsible for working and electrical safety on 
site must be nominated before any actions are taken in the field. The person responsible 
for on-site safety must ensure that there is no possibility the working location to be acci-
dentally supplied. To achieve these conditions, SFS 6002 [34] states that the working 
location must be: 
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• Completely disconnect with an air gap or insulation 
• Secured against reconnection of the electricity supply 
• Verified to be unsupplied with measurements taken from all phases 
• Equipped with work earthing  
• Protected from nearby live parts 
According to the standard, a field crew is not allowed to operate in severe weather con-
ditions, such as heavy rain, strong wind, or thunder. Because of this, repair work or man-
ual switching actions are usually delayed in major disturbance situations. [34]  
After the fault is repaired, supply is restored for the rest of the customers and switching 
state of the network is restored to the initial state. Operator is also responsible for report-
ing the fault. Reporting is made easier with the DMS, which stores the starting and ending 
times with switching events occurred in between. In addition, DMS calculates key figures 
of the fault, such as affected customers, customer hours and not supplied energy, to 
streamline the reporting process. [12] 
Customer service and notification are also DSOs responsibilities during fault situation. 
The Electricity Market Act states that customers must be informed about ongoing faults 
and estimated durations of the fault. The information about the fault can be provided with 
automatic telephone answering machine that contains pre-recorded or speech synthe-
sizer created feeder and location names combined with an estimated repair time. [12] 
Nowadays, automated SMS messages and web outage maps have mostly replaced the 
telephone answering machine. Because of the automatic notification, unnecessary 
phone calls from the customers can be reduced to relieve the workload of the operating 
personnel in the control center. This is especially beneficial during a major disruption, 
when plenty of customers are without electricity. [33] 
3.6 Impact of distributed generation in protection and fault man-
agement 
An increasing amount of distributed generation is changing the nature of the electricity 
generation from centralized power plants into smaller decentralized power generation 
units connected into medium and low voltage networks. Power flow of the distribution 
network is becoming more and more bidirectional instead of traditional convention, when 
power flows were unidirectional from the primary substation towards customer. [18] Con-
nection of the DG with active network management (ANM) provides many possibilities 
e.g. avoiding or delaying network reinforcements, reducing network losses, and micro 
grid operation during major disturbance situations. However, distributed generation 
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causes also challenges in network protection, fault management and voltage rise in weak 
networks. [35] 
3.6.1 Protection blinding 
The principle of an overcurrent protection is based on the minimum fault current that 
causes the relay to trip. Protection zone of a certain CB must cover the fault current level 
even from the end of the feeder, where fault current has its minimum value. The fault 
current contribution of the DG unit can disturb the operation of the protection relay by 
delaying the operation or even block the operation completely. This phenomenon is 
called protection blinding and it is caused by the DG unit feeding the fault current parallel 
with the feeding substation. [18] The parallel fed fault current by the DG unit is presented 
in the Figure 13. 
 
Figure 13.  Fault currents fed by the primary substation and the DG unit. 
Adapted from [35] 
Even if the operation of the relay is not completely interrupted, the protection-blinding 
effect can delay the operation of the relay that can cause the thermal limits of conductors 
and components to exceed. The blinding problem can be overcome by configuring the 
relay with more sensitive tripping values, but this can lead to a sympathetic tripping by 
fault on the adjacent feeder, tripping caused by starting currents of the DG units or trip-
ping by load current during maximum load conditions. The protection blinding can also 
be avoided by reinforcing the distribution network, but it usually makes connecting the 
problematic DG unit economically unfeasible. [18] 
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3.6.2 Adjacent feeder tripping 
A distributed generation can cause unnecessary tripping of the feeder, when fault occurs 
in the adjacent feeder. In situation like these, DG unit located on the adjacent feeder 
feeds a fault current trough a substation to the faulted feeder and causes an unwanted 
operation of the feeder protection. This problem occurs when the fault and the DG unit 
are located near the substation, fault current capacity of the generation unit is large 
enough and feeder is not protected with a directional protection. [18] Protection selectiv-
ity problem, or so-called sympathetic tripping, is presented in the Figure 14. 
 
 
Figure 14. Tripping of the adjacent feeder. Adapted from [35] 
Selectivity problems can usually be avoided with adequate protection relay settings. This 
can be overcome by changing the current settings of the relay located in the DG feeder, 
but in most cases, it cannot be done to ensure suitable protection in all of the fault situ-
ations. [18] Instead of changing the current limits, the operation time of the relay can be 
set slower in the feeder, including the DG unit. If a delayed operation time of the protec-
tion is used, precautions must be taken that thermal limits of components are not ex-
ceeded. In case these solutions are not possible, directional protection can be applied. 
Directional protection is the most definite solution, but it requires replacement of the old 
relays with new ones, which causes expenses. [35] 
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3.6.3 Failed reclosing and loss of mains protection 
Temporary faults are typically cleared by automatic reclosing, in which a fault arch is 
extinguished during non-supplied time. If the first reclosing fails, couple of more reclos-
ings are made before the circuit breaker is opened permanently. If distributed generation 
units are connected to the faulty feeder, voltage is sustained, and the fault arch is not 
extinguished. Therefore, all the DG units must be disconnected before the reclosing se-
quence is applied. Figure 15 illustrates the failed reclosing supplied by the tDG unit and 
the successful case of DG units disconnected before the reclose.  
 
Figure 15.  Failed reclosing due to DG unit [35] 
To coordinate the protection scheme with the feeder and DG protection, distributed gen-
eration units must be equipped with a loss of mains (LOM) protection. Thereby, the DG 
unit is disconnected instantly after the connection to the grid has been lost. In addition, 
after the fault has been cleared, the reconnection of the distributed generation must be 
done carefully to avoid harmful stress to the DG units. [36] The DG unit disconnected 
from the network must also be considered in a supply restoration. After the fault, distrib-
uted generation is not supporting the feeder and loading conditions differ from the pre-
fault situation. Thereby, supply restoration may not be possible even if constraint viola-
tions are not exceeded the load flow calculation of the pre-fault state. Modelling the DG 
units to the distribution management system is essential due to the increasing penetra-
tion of distributed energy resources. [18] 
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4. AUTOMATIC FAULT MANAGEMENT 
Automatic fault management defines an entity of automatic or semi-automatic function-
alities to detect, locate, and isolate a fault and restore electricity supply to non-faulted 
parts of the distribution network. The objective for automatic fault management is to min-
imize outage costs, human labor, and avoid unnecessary switching operations. [12] Au-
tomatic fault management does not affect the number of outages, but duration and extent 
of the outage can be reduced. Especially in a major disturbance situation, multiple faults 
are occurring at the same time and operators are not able to handle all of them in desir-
able time. Distribution networks are geographically widespread, consisting of densely 
populated urban areas and forested rural areas especially prone to faults. [37] Despite 
of the major investments made to increase the reliability by cabling, it is not cost-efficient 
to renovate the whole network, but instead increase the amount of automation and utilize 
existing automation more efficiently.  
The control strategy of automatic operations can be categorized into centralized and 
decentralized schemes. [5] In the centralized method, automatic fault management is 
implemented as a part of the SCADA and the distribution management system. The cen-
tralized system can utilize the information of the whole network, including switching state 
and calculations for load flow and protection. Therefore, the state of the network can be 
checked before and after the fault to plan the most optimal use of backup connections 
or to check the constrain violations of switching operations. Excessive amount of data 
can also be considered as a disadvantage, since it must be stored and transferred in 
real-time. [10] The basic principle of the centralized scheme is presented in the Figure 
16.  
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Figure 16. Simplified schematic of the centralized FLIR concept. Adapted 
from [10, 38] 
Instead of collecting and analyzing the data in one centralized system, operations can 
be distributed to the intelligent controllers of the primary substations and the secondary 
substations. In a so called decentralized or distributed agent-based control scheme, sub-
station controllers are communicating with each other, in which information of the fault 
indication is queried towards downstream of the feeder. When the faulty section is lo-
cated, substation controllers isolate the line section and send information to the primary 
substation and the NCC operator. [38] Compared to the centralized method, benefits of 
the decentralized system are its simplicity and fast operation. However, to achieve a 
large-scale decentralized control system, major investments must be made, equipping 
secondary substations with automation. The basic principle of the decentralized solution 
is presented in the Figure 17. One solution is to use both centralized and decentralized 
schemes together applying local control to the most critical parts of the network. [10] 
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Figure 17. Simplified schematic of the de-centralized FLIR concept. Adapted 
from [10, 38] 
Regardless of the solution method of the automatic operation, the final responsibility of 
the process and electrical safety belongs to the NCC operator. Hence, there have been 
disagreements whether a computer should perform all the actions, or should a human 
operator confirm the actions made by the automation. [39] A comprehensive FLIR solu-
tion should include different levels of operation from the assisting mode confirmed by the 
operator to the fully independent mode operated by the automation. Especially in a com-
pletely automated solution, every possible safety issue must be considered. Possible 
safety issues for the FLIR operation are e.g. a field crew working alongside the faulty 
feeder, loss of communication, or an incorrect operation of switches.  
4.1 Fault location and isolation 
The first step in the FLIR function is fault detection. When a permanent fault occurs in 
the medium voltage feeder, protection relay trips, circuit breaker is opened, and faulty 
feeder is de-energized. Information about the fault is then sent to SCADA and forwarded 
to DMS. Fault detection in case of a short circuit fault is usually straightforward process 
due to high magnitude of fault currents. Earth faults instead require additional methods 
in compensated or neutral-isolated distribution networks due to fault currents often lower 
than the load current. [12] 
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There are several ways to determine the possible location of a fault depending on the 
type of the fault and the fault information available. Fault location methods are dependent 
on information gathered from the protection relay and the fault detectors combined with 
the network model stored in the database. Not always fault current measurements or 
operations of fault indicators are available or feasible enough to estimate the fault loca-
tion. Therefore, statistical and probability-based methods, as well as methods using trial 
and error, must be used. [12] 
To achieve the most effective fault location process, these methods are combined. If 
available, the first inference of the possible location is carried out with a fault distance 
calculation based on the fault current measurements. These variables are then combined 
with e.g. fault indicator operations, environmental or component condition-based factors 
to deduce possible faulted zones by fuzzy reasoning. [12] A limitation of the possible 
fault area reduces a number of potentially harmful and time-consuming trial switching. 
Also, supply can be restored to the certain disconnector zones, if they can be deduced 
as un-faulted before the fault is completely located and isolated.  
4.1.1 Fault distance calculation 
The fault distance calculation, based on the current and voltage measurements, is the 
main information used inferencing the fault location in case of a short circuit fault. Due to 
the earthing type of the Finnish distribution network, earth faults cannot be located using 
the fundamental frequency fault current magnitude, but study of the transients and har-
monics must be included. In calculational methods, measurements received from the 
relay are compared to corresponding calculated values of the network model in DMS. 
Therefore, correctness of the technical parameters and the switching state is a key factor 
in fault location deduction. [12] 
Modern microprocessor-based protection relays usually provide a fault current measure-
ment and information on the faulty phases. With this information, the system calculates 
all the points in the distribution feeder, where the calculated fault current meets the meas-
ured value. [40] Figure 18 illustrates the situation with multiple calculated fault distances. 
A maximum fault distance can be calculated with a fault resistance value of 0 Ω, but 
minimum distance is highly dependent on the fault resistance. Therefore, defining the 
minimum distance is remarkably more uncertain. [41] An accurate fault distance calcu-
lation solely based on current magnitude also requires information on the feeding net-
work impedance and the distributed generation along the feeder. If the capacity of the 
DG is small enough, it can be reduced out of the calculation, but the increasing number 
of DG units requires them to be modelled in the fault current calculations. [42] 
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Figure 18. Possible fault distances based on short circuit calculations 
A measured fault current includes also a load current component. The superposed load 
current component changes dynamically with the change of voltage during the fault, and 
thus it must be compensated using theoretical models presented in Equations 4.1 and 
4.2 [41]: 
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,      (4.2) 
where U1 and U2 present the voltages before and during the fault, P1 and P2 are the cor-
responding active power and Q1 and Q2 the corresponding reactive power values. Pu and 
Qu are the parameters used to model the voltage dependency of the loads. According to 
the analyses made in the distribution networks, the ranges of values are Pu = 1.5 – 2.0 
and Qu = 2.0 – 6.0. [41] Typically, these parameters are manually set in the DMS fault 
inference settings by the system user.  
Accuracy of the fault distance calculation can be improved with voltage measurement in 
the substation. If both the current and the voltage are measured during the fault, the fault 
distance can be calculated using reactance of the faulty line. In addition to the improved 
accuracy of the distance relays, the reactance method can be used in the meshed net-
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work because the direction of the fault current is available. [41] After the relay has cal-
culated the distance, either a reactance or a simple length value is transmitted to the 
DMS where it is compared to the line lengths of the network model.  
The location of the earth faults has been problematic in the neutral isolated and compen-
sated distribution networks. Since the fault current and the load current are in the same 
order of magnitude, fundamental frequency measurements cannot be used at the pre-
cise location of the earth fault. [40] However, more advanced methods have been devel-
oped that studies the measured harmonics and transients at the beginning of the earth 
fault. These methods have been successfully tested in the 110 kV sub-transmission net-
work, but in distribution networks, the high fault resistance limits the use of these meth-
ods. It has been studied that fault resistances over 50 Ω dampen the transients below 
the limit where the fault distance calculation is not accurate enough. [43] Sometimes fault 
occurs as a double line to ground fault, where both earth and short-circuit protection units 
operate, and if the short-circuit protection registers the fault, it can be located using fault 
distance calculation. [17] 
4.1.2 Fault inference 
Measurements received from the relay and fault indicator operations can sometimes be 
inadequate to deduce the exact location of the fault. As the distribution system contains 
plenty of uncertain variables and heuristic information, inference methods using artificial 
intelligence (AI) are used to combine shattered information into qualitative variables. [44]  
The fuzzy logic is widely used in the field of process control. Variables in the fuzzy logic 
are rather considered as linguistic objects, such as relatively high or almost empty, than 
strict 0 or 1 values. Fuzzy logic allows uncertain, heuristic, and qualitative information to 
be determined as membership functions of fuzzy sets. That kind of information could be 
e.g. a fault detector operation, an overhead line located in the forest, or condition of the 
network component. [12] Unlike straightforward rule-based system, the fuzzy logic ap-
proach may be used with multi-source information containing inaccurate transient meas-
urements and versatile environmental factors. [44] The inference model of fault location 
is presented in Figure 19. 
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Figure 19. Fuzzy-logic based fault inference system. Adapted from [12, 44] 
In the fuzzy logic system, measurements and indications are fuzzyfied into membership 
functions of fuzzy sets and then combined with fuzzyfied information of the knowledge 
base as presented in Figure 19. For example, severe weather condition data affects the 
plausibility of fault indicator operations or increases the weight of the overhead lines lo-
cated in the forest. After the uncertain factors, measurements, and indications are com-
bined, the fuzzy set with the highest membership is defuzzyficated into a crisp value of 
the inferred fault location. [44]  
Artificial neural networks (ANN) differ from the common expert system for not needing a 
knowledge base to operate. Instead of predefined rules, ANNs are trained with numerous 
real cases or simulations. Artificial neural network consists of input layer, hidden layers, 
and the output layer. Each of the layers contains multiple neurons, which are connected 
to all the previous and the next layer neurons. A single neuron can be considered as a 
processor forming a single output from multiple input variables using a simple non-linear 
equation. Neuron of the ANN uses weights to determine the proportion of each input to 
be summed and equated with an activation function. The training procedure of the ANNs 
is based on minimization of the error between example input data and target output val-
ues. On each of the training steps, weights of the neurons are adjusted to achieve im-
proved output. [44]  
Today’s distribution networks are constantly becoming more complex, having large 
amount of data to be processed. Therefore, the artificial neural network solutions can be 
beneficial because of ANNs high performance of processing large amounts of data from 
multiple sources. Artificial neural networks are also resilient to partially incoherent data 
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and can recover from faulty operations by itself. Potential applications for artificial neural 
networks are e.g. fault inference using data from transient and harmonics measure-
ments, disturbance recordings, and variety of open data. [45] Although the ANN applica-
tions are prominent possibility in distribution network fault management, deeper under-
standing is not in the scope of this thesis.  
Fault indicators are one of the key elements in fault inference, especially in the cabled 
urban networks. Fault indicators are becoming more common in new urban area sec-
ondary substations and disconnector stations, but devices installed in overhead lines are 
usually found out to be unreliable and too expensive for large scale deployment. [46] 
Due to uncertain operation, plausibility of the fault indications must be checked before 
using the data in fault inference.  
 
Figure 20. Fault inference using fault detector operations. Estimated faulty 
zone is located between RCD A3 and BU1. 
Environmental factors, such as the placement of the conductor, height of the surrounding 
forest and weather data, can also be used to deduce the fault location. Especially during 
severe weather conditions, overhead lines are exposed to falling trees and tree branches 
due to high winds or heavy snow loads. [17] Information of the overhead lines located in 
the forest may not be solely efficient way to infer the fault location. Also, information of 
the surrounding forest maintenance and e.g. direction of the wind or amount of the snow-
fall must be used to weight the most fault prone line sections.  
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Figure 21 presents the situation where the fault indicator operations are not plausible. 
According to the calculated fault distances, a fault could exist in both branches behind 
disconnector A1 and B2. However, the overhead line behind disconnector B1 is usually 
more prone to faults than the underground cable behind disconnector A1. Therefore, the 
calculated fault location between disconnectors B3 and B5, where an overhead line is 
located in the forest, is the most prominent fault location.  
 
Figure 21. Fault inference using environmental factors. Estimated faulty zone 
is located between RCD B3 and B5.  
Statistical fault history of the line sections can also be used as a data source for fault 
inference. Usually exact fault locations are documented during fault reporting or faulty 
disconnector zones can be approximately defined from the fault reports. [19] If a fault 
location has been in a certain disconnector zone multiple times, line sections of the dis-
connector zone can be marked as fault prone sections. Due to the changing conditions 
of the distribution network e.g. renovation and maintenance, this kind of a statistical his-
tory data should be updated when, for example, overhead line is replaced with an under-
ground cable.  
4.1.3 Trial switching  
Experimental method of trial switching is commonly used in a traditional fault manage-
ment as described in chapter 3.5. The trial switching method is utilized to locate the faulty 
disconnector zone if there are not enough variables to deduce the exact fault location or 
the fault location inference results more than one possible location. The principle of the 
trial switching is to divide the faulty feeder using disconnectors and close the substation 
circuit breaker against the suspected fault. If the circuit breaker trips, the fault is located 
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between the CB and opened disconnector, otherwise the fault is located behind the 
opened disconnector. By these means, procedure is repeated until the fault is located to 
a single disconnector zone. After the fault is located and isolated with remote-controlled 
operations, operator continues the trial switching by dispatching field crews to operate 
manual disconnectors. [12] The effectivity of an automatic trial switching method relies 
on the number of RCDs along the feeder and the reliability of the communication [39].   
In a bi-section method, faulted feeder is divided into approximately two equally sized 
zones. Division of the feeder can be based on the length of the feeder, the number of 
customers or type of the line sections. For example, a rural part consisting of overhead 
lines, in which fault probability is higher, can be separated from the section in a town 
plan area. After the disconnector is opened, the circuit breaker in the primary substation 
is closed against the suspected fault. If the circuit breaker stays closed, the fault is lo-
cated behind the opened disconnector. The operator continues to divide the feeder into 
smaller sections until the fault is located between two remote controlled disconnectors. 
[12] A simplified example of bi-section method is presented in Figure 22.  
 
Figure 22. Bi-section method in simplified feeder 
1. Circuit breaker trips due to permanent fault and the feeder is de-energized 
2. Feeder is bisected using remote-controlled disconnector A and the circuit breaker 
stays closed. Fault is located behind the RCD A. 
3. Suspected fault area is bisected using remote-controlled disconnector B and 
RCD A is closed.  
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4. Circuit breaker trips and fault can be located between RCDs A and B. Supply can 
be restored via backup connection from the end of the feeder.  
5. Remote-controlled disconnector C dividing zone between A and B is opened. 
Circuit breaker is closed.  
6. Circuit breaker trips and fault can be located between RCDs A and C.  
7. Remote-controlled disconnector A is opened, and fault is isolated for operator to 
handle. Supply can be restored to RCD zone C – B using the backup connection.  
Another method for trial switching is so called zone-by-zone rolling or step-by-step 
method. The basic principle of the zone-by-zone rolling is to energize the feeder one 
disconnector zone at a time. Usually all the RCDs of the faulted feeder are opened and 
then closed after another until the fault has been located. Likewise, in the bi-section 
method, the circuit breaker is closed against the suspected fault and the CB tripping 
indicates the faulty zone. Simplified zone-by-zone rolling method in straightforward 
feeder branch is described in the Figure 23.  
 
             
Figure 23. Zone-by-zone rolling method 
1. Circuit breaker trips due to permanent fault and the feeder is de-energized. RCDs 
in the branch are opened. 
2. –   6.   Remote controlled disconnectors are closed one by one towards down-
stream until the upstream RCD of faulty zone is closed. 
7. Circuit breaker trips and fault is located. 
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8. Faulty zone is isolated, and supply can be restored to feeder upstream from the 
substation and feeder downstream using open backup connection. 
Disadvantage of the zone-by-zone rolling method is its long execution time in case of a 
long branching feeder including multiple disconnector zones. On the other hand, number 
of unnecessary tripping of the circuit breaker can be reduced. [12] While the bi-section 
method is faster but can include more network straining tripping of the circuit breaker, 
one possible solution is to combine these two methods. The first coarse sequence is 
performed using the bi-section method, if there are RCDs available in the faulty zone. 
After the feeder bisection, the zone-by-zone method is applied until the fault is located 
to the one RCD zone. [39] 
There are certain disadvantages in the trial switching method. In case of a short circuit 
fault, resupplying the faulty feeder against the fault causes thermal stress in the conduc-
tors and the circuit breaker. This is most harmful in the cabled network due to slow cool-
ing time of the conductors. Therefore, number of trials must be limited or even disabled 
in some of the feeders. [41] Subsequent trial switching against the earth fault causes 
voltage strain between healthy phases and the ground. A single-phase earth fault can 
thereby develop into a cross-country earth fault and increase the extent of the faulty area. 
Overvoltage can also cause damage to network insulation and customer devices. [41] 
Also, the electrical safety of the working personnel along the network must be considered 
in the utilization of automatic trial switching. Operation of the trial switching sequence 
must be blocked to prevent re-energization when the field crew is operating in the faulty 
feeder near energized network equipment. [28] 
4.2 Supply restoration 
Even though distribution feeders are operated radially, the distribution network is built as 
meshed with open tie point switches. Tie point switches are used to optimize the distri-
bution network load flow and to operate as a reserve connection in outage situations. 
After the fault has been located and isolated, the supply can be restored to the healthy 
parts of the feeder if possible. Depending on the location of the isolated RCD zone, parts 
of the feeder can be restored either from the upstream direction of the substation or via 
open backup connections from adjacent feeders. If a certain branch of the faulted feeder 
can be stated as un-faulted, supply may be restored even before the complete fault iso-
lation to minimize outage costs. When the trial switching sequence is used, restored 
branches must still be isolated from the main supply route between the fault and the 
substation to avoid unnecessary short breaks. [15] 
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In automatic supply restoration, the DMS can be used to check possible constraint vio-
lations for each of the backup connections. The load flow calculation ensures that the 
maximum loading capacity of the adjacent feeder is not exceeded, and voltage drop 
stays in desired limits. Also, the network protection of the adjacent feeder must stay 
functional after the restored area is connected. The DMS calculates the lowest short-
circuit current as well as earth fault currents and compares them to the relay settings. 
constraint violations are detected, the backup connection cannot be used in supply res-
toration. [9] Usually in normal operating conditions, the network is planned to withstand 
the effect of load transfer between the feeders, but violations may still occur during high 
load situations and when the network switching state differs from normal due to e.g. a 
major disturbance situation. [47]  
Advanced distribution automation and increasing degree of distributed energy resources 
(DER) will provide possibilities to support load balancing between feeders in supply res-
toration. In some cases, DER may even operate a feeder branch in islanded mode when 
backup connections are not available. [48] In terms of a backup supply, DG can be di-
vided into two categories according to operation modes: BDG (Black-start DG) and 
NBDG (Non-Black-start DG). The BDG can be used as parallel with the supplying distri-
bution grid to support the backup connection, or in islanded operation mode. The NBDG 
is only capable of parallel support without the island operation. The black-start capable 
DG usually includes an energy storage combined with the generation unit to act as a 
complement in short power gaps, especially in solar and wind power solutions. [49] 
Modern microprocessor-based relays often include an option for remote-configuration or 
parallel configuration settings. These functionalities with improved communication archi-
tecture can be used to change the fault current settings and tripping delays during unu-
sual switching conditions. [15] Reconfiguration of a single feeder terminal, in most cases, 
requires also reconfiguration of adjacent feeder terminals and upstream substation relay 
to maintain selectivity of the protection. Challenging coordination between multi-level 
protection may lead to safety issues and network equipment failures in case of a setting 
error. Also increasing penetration of distributed generation complicates coordination of 
protection as described in the chapter 3.6. Therefore, automatic reconfiguration of pro-
tection is not the preferred method, at least with current state of the network automation 
and communication infrastructure. [15, 35] Figure 24 presents the conceptual model of 
the DER and protection coordination utilized in the supply restoration.  
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Figure 24. Supply restoration scheme including DER and protection reconfig-
uration 
Besides technical limitations, an adjacent feeder may not be suitable for a backup con-
nection due to important customers or a high number of customers. Even when the fault 
is automatically isolated, there is still a chance of malfunction in the fault isolation logic 
or multiple faults occurring on the same feeder.  Especially during severe weather con-
ditions, several trees may be leaning against the overhead line causing multiple faults. If 
another fault occurs in the downstream of the isolated RCD zone, automatic isolation 
sequence is not able to detect that. When supply is tried to restore to the downstream 
section, the adjacent feeder also trips, and extent of the outage area increases. [50] 
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5. MICROSCADA PRO 
The MicroSCADA Pro is a product family for controlling and monitoring electricity net-
works, made by ABB. Product portfolio of consists the SYS600 and the DMS600. 
SYS600 is the SCADA system, used for real-time monitoring and controlling of the pri-
mary and secondary equipment in the network. DMS600 is the distribution management 
system, which consists of two main applications: DMS600 Network Editor (NE) and 
DMS600 Workstation (WS). DMS600 applications run in Microsoft Windows or Server 
operating systems using Windows Service based add-ins and SQL database to com-
municate with SYS600 and external interfaces. [51] Communications between the appli-
cations are visualized in Figure 25. 
 
Figure 25. Communication between MicroSCADA Pro applications.  
MicroSCADA Pro applications can also be used with systems from other vendors. For 
example, DMS600 WS is widely used with Tieto PowerGrid (PG) or Tieto Smart Utility 
network information systems and the SCADA systems from other suppliers. Network in-
formation can be imported with a transfer file or with an external Network Import Tool 
module, which writes information directly to the SQL database. In addition, a network 
model can be imported from the GIS (Graphical Information System) database with the 
Network Import Tool module. Automated import methods reduce the workload of the 
DSO since only one network model has to be maintained.  
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The integration between DMS600 and SYS600 is implemented using OPC Data Access 
(OPC DA) communication standard or the ABB specific SCIL-API. Besides SYS600, it is 
possible to use SCADA system from other vendors, if only the OPC communication is 
available. Therefore, SCADA system using ELCOM-90 or IEC-104 as a communication 
standard needs SYS600 to handle the communication with the WS. As introduced in the 
Figure 25. DMS600 includes three background services for internal and external com-
munication: DMS Socket Service, DMS600 Server Application and DMSService Frame-
work. [51] The DMS Socket Service handles the internal TCP/IP messaging between 
DMS600 instances and the background services. The DMS600 Server Application 
(DMS600 SA) is used for establishing connection and managing the data transfer be-
tween MicroSCADA and WS, when the SCIL-API is used. [51] 
The DMSService Framework consists of monitoring application and several modules for 
internal communications and scheduled tasks as well as interface for 3rd party applica-
tions. [52] The OPC Client is responsible of the communication between DMS600 and 
the SCADA. Because of the OPC Client, DMS600 can be used with any SCADA system 
that supports OPC DA standard. Also, with the SYS600, OPC has become the preferred 
method of communication and SCIL-API is rarely used. The OPC connection requires 
mapping between SCADA process points and remote-controlled devices documented in 
the DMS. [52] 
5.1 MicroSCADA Pro SYS600 
MicroSCADA Pro SYS600 interacts with the distribution process via process database 
that consists of linked process points to the control and monitoring devices. Information 
gathered into the process database can be then visualized in the: Process display, 
Trends display, Event display, Alarm display and Measurement reports. The communi-
cation between the SYS600 and the RTUs and IEDs in the primary process can be im-
plemented with common protocols such as IEC 61850, Modbus, SPA and LON. [53] The 
information flow of the SYS600 is visualized in Figure 26. 
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Figure 26. Information flow of the SYS600 adapted from [53] 
The process display presents the topology of the network and allows operator to control 
the switching devices. The SYS600 application usually consists of several smaller pro-
cess displays including one primary substation and the overview display to present sim-
plified schematic topology of the network. The overview process display of the SYS600 
demo application is presented in  Figure 27. In addition to the switching components and 
transformers, the primary substation display typically includes the most important meas-
urements and alarm indications. The process display can also be used to monitor the 
status of the system itself. [53] 
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Figure 27. Process display of the SYS600 including multiple substations  
Along with the process display, it is possible to show a list of all events and alarms of the 
system in Event and Alarm displays. The trends display and the measurement reports 
can be used to present the measured values, such as energy, voltage, current or protec-
tion device operations, as graphs or numerical tables. That allows the operator to ana-
lyze, for example, power quality and the root cause of the disturbance. [53] 
5.2 MicroSCADA Pro DMS600  
The DMS600 consists of two main applications: Network Editor (DMS600 NE) and Work-
station (DMS600 WS). The Network Editor is used to maintain the network information 
and carry out administrative tasks, such as management of the integration between 
SYS600 and DMS600 and common settings of the DMS600 application. Because of the 
scope of this thesis, only the DMS600 WS is introduced more precisely focusing on the 
functionalities used in automatic fault management. The Workstation is an application 
for controlling and monitoring the distribution network. It utilizes the network information 
documented with the Network Editor or imported from external network information sys-
tem along with switching state and measurement information received from the SCADA 
system. [51] 
Typically, DMS600 WS includes a geographical topology presentation on a background 
map with embedded substation diagrams. Additionally, the network view can be pre-
sented as a schematic view to simplify the visual presentation. GUI of the Workstation 
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also includes an Auxiliary Network Window, which shows an overview of the whole net-
work, Connection Status bar to visualize the connection statuses with color indications 
as well as legends for symbols and network coloring. If the connection to SYS600 is 
established, process displays and SYS600 Switch Control dialogs can be opened and 
operated from the WS. [11] GUI of the DMS600 demo application is shown in the Figure 
28. 
 
Figure 28. The GUI of the DMS600 Workstation  
When operated in the real-time state monitoring mode, the network analysis is carried 
out automatically in the background and topology is updated by switching state infor-
mation received from SCADA. To achieve enhanced performance during major disturb-
ance situation, a disturbance mode that disables certain functions of the WS, such as 
automatic fault location and load flow calculation, can be used. DMS600 WS can also be 
used in a simulation mode, which disables the control to the real-time system allowing 
the operator to analyze various switching states or examine already handled fault situa-
tions. Switching actions and simulation settings, such as modified relay data or load fore-
casts, are saved only to the current instance of the DMS600 WS. [11] 
DMS600 WS includes several functionalities to visualize and analyze the distribution 
network. Geographical model of the distribution network, including manual switching de-
vices and secondary substations, connects primary substations and remote-controlled 
devices into an overall topology model. Therefore, operator or automation can manage 
and optimize the switching state of the whole network efficiently. DMS600 WS also in-
cludes a network load flow and protection analysis to detect potential constraint violations 
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during e.g. high load situations and network reconfiguration. A switching planning func-
tionality allows pre-made switching sequences to be made or automatically generated 
for the maintenance outage process.  [11]   
DMS600 includes variety of functionalities in fault management for medium voltage and 
low voltage networks. The MV fault management consists of visualizing the faulty feeder 
in the network view with calculated fault distances, if relay measurements are available. 
If fault can be definitely located into a certain disconnector zone, line sections are high-
lighted in the feeder topology. Fault are operated from the fault management dialog, 
which is automatically opened when permanent fault indication has been received from 
the SCADA. Outage information tab shows all outages occurring in the distribution area 
with detailed information about e.g. count of customers and LV networks affected and 
outage durations. [11] 
 
Figure 29. Fault Management dialog, fault distance indication and Outage In-
formation tab of DMS600 WS 
Multiple faults can be handled at the same time with separate DMS600 WS applications. 
Operator can take the responsibility of a certain fault from the fault management dialog 
and start the fault isolation process using the fault distance and inference information 
provided. More detailed information of the fault can also be observed and modified after-
wards for simulation purposes. After the fault has been repaired, operator can proceed 
into a fault reporting. DMS600 WS automatically generates an outage report template 
based on the executed switching sequence and calculates the key values according the 
network data.  
Fault management of DMS600 WS consists also several other functionalities, but due to 
the scope of this thesis, only the fault location, isolation and restoration functionalities 
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are introduced in detail. Besides aforementioned functions, DMS600 fault management 
consists of reporting and archiving for MV and LV network outages, field crew manage-
ment, outage prioritization based on outage costs and critical customers, management 
of customer calls and interface for automatic meter reading system. Also, automatic cus-
tomer notification by SMS messages and web-based outage info map can be achieved 
with an external interface.  
5.2.1 Fault detection and location 
The fault location functionality of DMS600 Workstation can be used to determine an ex-
act fault location along the feeder by fault distance calculation, or faulty disconnector 
zone based on fault detector operations and fault inference according to the conductor 
types and overloading network components. The fault location function can handle per-
manent feeder faults in radial operated feeders in neutral isolated, compensated or neu-
tral earthed distribution networks. Generators feeding relatively small short circuit cur-
rents can be reduced to simplify the fault distance calculation.  
When the permanent fault has occurred, available fault data and fault detector operations 
are sent from SCADA to DMS600 WS. Position indication of the substation circuit 
breaker and fault indicator operations are sent from the SCADA OPC Server to DMS600 
WS through OPC Client of the DMS Service framework. The fault data is then applied 
with Fault Service module that creates a fault package containing gathered information. 
The process flow of the fault creation is presented in the Figure 30. 
 
Figure 30. Process flow of the fault information between SCADA and DMS600 
WS 
Process points of the feeder terminal trip and measurement signals must be attached to 
the corresponding signal definitions of the Fault Service by a configuration tool. Keeping 
Fault Service configuration up to date is essential for the fault location functionality. For 
example, there have been situations where the fault current measurements have not 
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been received, or the fault package have not been created due to configuration errors. 
Occasionally the lack of fault current measurements may depend on the communication 
errors or delays with protection devices, RTU and SCADA. [54] Fault Service is configu-
rable by the means of delaying the fault package creation to wait delayed measurements, 
but usually DSOs require fault to be established immediately to achieve real-time cus-
tomer notification [19]. Effectivity of the fault package creation should be improved by 
updating the information of existing fault after the establishment.  
After the fault has been established in DMS600 WS, fault distance calculation is per-
formed automatically. As presented in the Figure 29, if the measurements are plausible 
calculated fault distances are visualized in the faulty feeder by bolt symbols. Distribution 
feeder usually includes multiple branches having equal electrical distances and there 
may be several distance calculations available. This might be helpful guidance to the 
operator deducing the fault location but challenging for automation to handle. Besides 
fault distance calculation, on-site and remote-readable fault indicators can be used to 
determine the faulty branch or disconnector zone. Fault distance and fault indicator op-
erations along with conductor type and overloading components are used by the fault 
inference logic of DMS600 WS that is based on fuzzy sets introduced in chapter 4.1.2. 
DMS600 WS calculates the likelihood of a fault for each disconnector zone as presented 
in the Figure 31. 
 
Figure 31. Fuzzy logic calculated fault likelihoods for RCD zones  
Determination of the faulty zone depends on the limits set by the user. Likelihood limit 
settings require the minimum limit for a faulted zone and the maximum limit for healthy 
zones. [11] In the example above, minimum limit for faulty zone is set to 0.5 and maxi-
mum limit for healthy zone is set to 0.3. Therefore, zone with a likelihood of 0.68 is de-
fined as the faulty RCD zone and rest of the zones having likelihood below 0.16 as 
healthy zones. Fault location limits and certainty factors for fuzzy sets must be carefully 
set according to the prevailing situations. For example, overhead line is more prone to 
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fault during high winds and heavy snow loads, or fault indicator operations may be incor-
rect during thunderstorm. [12] 
5.2.2 Automatic fault isolation and restoration 
The current automatic fault isolation and restoration mode of DMS600 WS requires faulty 
remote-controlled zone to be determined with the fault inference logic. If the faulty zone 
cannot be determined, execution of the automatic sequence is stopped, and fault is 
handed over to the operator. When a single faulty RCD zone is determined, fault isolation 
and restoration planning generates a switching sequence to isolate the faulty zone and 
to restore healthy feeders using backup connections or supply from the feeder upstream. 
The sequence takes into account the technical constraints and the protection of the net-
work [11]: 
• Voltage drop 
• Short-circuit capacity and load level  
• Short-circuit and earth fault detection 
If technical constraints are fulfilled and the switching sequence is successfully created, 
isolation and restoration sequence can be either started automatically or after operator’s 
confirmation. Created switching sequence is sent to MicroSCADA, which checks the 
controllability of the switching devices. If errors in operability of switching devices are 
detected, MicroSCADA rejects the sequence and requests a new sequence to be made 
excluding the un-controllable devices. After the switching sequence has been confirmed 
as successful, MicroSCADA starts the execution step by step. Before each step, switch-
ing state of the feeder is checked to correspond the switching plan. If switching states 
differ or MicroSCADA is not able to carry out the switching action, e.g. due to communi-
cation error, automatic fault isolation and restoration is interrupted, and it must be man-
ually restarted. [11] The process flow diagram of the current automatic fault isolation and 
restoration mode is presented in the Appendix A.  
In the version 4.5 of the DMS600 WS, fault restoration logic will be enhanced by restoring 
the supply to all remote zones where the fault does not definitely exist. This is achieved 
by combining the most likely faulty zones and checking if rest of the RCD zones can be 
restored via backup connections or from the feeding substation. Fault management dia-
log also includes a Restoration plan dialog, which operator can use to create sequence 
using either remote-controlled or manual switching devices when the fault location is 
known. Restoration plan dialog can also be used to create switching sequence to return 
to the switching state before the fault, or to the normal switching state of the distribution 
network. [55]  
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6. INTERVIEWS FOR DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM 
OPERATORS 
An interview for Finnish distribution system operators was implemented to gather com-
prehensive knowledge on fault isolation and supply restoration process carried out by 
human operators. Thus, a more human-like operation, most desired features and possi-
ble restrictions could be implemented on the FLIR algorithm. Interviewed DSOs pre-
sented in Figure 32 were: 
• Savon Voima Verkko Oy (highlighted with blue) 
• Kajave Oy (highlighted with green) 
• Koilis-Satakunnan Sähkö Oy (highlighted with purple) 
 
 
Figure 32. Distribution areas of the interviewed DSOs 
The inquiry was carried out with semi-structured interviews where the basic structure of 
the questionnaire was sent to DSOs in advance. Thus, the representatives of the DSO 
were able to delve into the subject, and limited interview time could be utilized more 
efficiently. With semi-structured interview, meetings could be carried out rather open 
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conversation, so as much as operators own knowledge and experience could be gath-
ered. The questionnaire, presented in Appendix B, consists of topics: 
• General information about the network and methods to increase the distribution 
reliability 
• Required features and restrictions according to the automatic fault location, iso-
lation and supply restoration 
• Fault isolation and restoration process performed by the operator 
• The most important features to be implemented in the DMS600 WS 
Interviewed DSOs were selected based on already known demand for the FLIR function-
ality and variety of the SCADA and DMS system combinations in use. For the objective 
of this thesis, all the studied distribution system operators were operating mostly in rural 
network areas, where the demand for a centralized FLIR solution is greater. Interviews 
were carried out in the premises of the DSO that created also an opportunity to see the 
NCC operation in action. The meetings were recorded and transcribed afterwards. Rep-
resentatives of the DSO were informed if interview contains confidential information that 
cannot be published in this thesis.  
6.1 Savon Voima Verkko Oy 
Savon Voima Verkko Oy (SVV) is a DSO operating in the Northern Savonia region. SVV 
is a subsidiary of Savon Voima Oyj having operations also in electricity generation and 
district heating. Electricity sales and energy services are operated by Väre Energia Oy, 
a nationwide joint company formed by Savon Voima, Jyväskylän Energia, and Kuopion 
Energia. [56] According to the Energy Authority, during year 2018 SVV distributed elec-
tricity to over 117 000 household and industry customers [57]. As a distribution manage-
ment system SVV uses MicroSCADA Pro DMS600 Workstation. Alongside the DMS600 
WS, SVV is using Tieto Smart Utility network information system (TSU-NIS) and Mi-
croSCADA Pro SYS600 as a SCADA system. [58] The distribution area according to the 
web outage map is presented in Figure 33. 
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Figure 33. Distribution are of SVV according to the outage info map presenta-
tion [59] 
Total length of the distribution network is almost 27 000 km, of which about 12 000 km 
is MV network. SVV operates also approximately 520 km of regional 110 kV transmission 
network. According to the statistics of 2018, cabling rate of the MV network was 13.1 % 
and 37,9 % in the LV network. There are 43 primary substations with over 300 feeders 
and approximately 1 900 remote-controlled disconnectors installed in the distribution net-
work of SVV. The distribution area of SVV is highly forested and thus prone to fault es-
pecially during severe weather conditions. [53]  
To meet the distribution reliability requirements, SVV is utilizing variety of resources. 
Besides replacing overhead lines with cables, an overhead line is also installed beside 
roads and nearby forest is maintained. 1 kV network solutions and an increasing amount 
of network automation, such as remote-controlled disconnector stations and reclosers, 
are also considered to enhance the distribution reliability especially in rural feeders. In-
terviewees noted that not all of the distribution network will be cabled due to high invest-
ment costs, but existing and upcoming network automation will be utilized more effi-
ciently, and the overall fault management process will be enhanced.  
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SVV had a pilot project of deploying advanced secondary substation automation with a 
reactive power compensation and fault indicators. Fault indicators were discovered to be 
unreliable in both short-circuit and earth fault situation. It was also noted that a compen-
sation device installed in the same substation with fault indicator made the fault indicator 
operation even more unreliable. Utilization of distributed energy resources is not yet con-
sidered as a part of supply restoration, since distribution network operator is not allowed 
to own DER units. Some of the hydropower units of the distribution area can be operated 
in islanded mode, but current level of automation does not support automatic use. [58] 
Due to the varying conditions and fault situations, SVV does not have strict guidelines 
for handling an individual fault besides electrical safety and technical limits. According to 
the interviewees, there are some variations on how the operator locates and isolates the 
fault. For example, when there is no information to locate the fault, operators are using 
their intuition or knowledge of the environmental conditions to perform the first trial 
switching action. While there are multiple sources of open data, e.g. forest height, and 
wind speed and direction, the operator does not have time to analyse that during the 
fault situation, but instead the management of the data should be automatic and visual-
ized properly in the network view of the DMS. [58] 
According to the interviewees, the automatic fault location of the DMS600 only performs 
accurately in rather simple overhead line feeders in case of the short-circuit fault. How-
ever, the fault current measurement is not always available due to communication or 
configuration errors of the relays. Therefore, the only option for locating the fault is to 
perform trial switchings or receive the fault location through an external inspection, e.g. 
a customer call or helicopter inspection. The method of experimental switching is also 
varying among the operators. Usually the faster bi-section method is used for the first 
trial switching, but zone-by-zone rolling method is also used for example with shorter 
feeders. [58] 
Current implementation of the automatic fault isolation and supply restoration of the 
DMS600 is not feasible enough according to the SVV representatives. All the interview-
ees agreed that automation may perform switching actions and restore supply inde-
pendently. When automation is used, electrical safety must be ensured carefully and 
execution of the FLIR sequence must be stopped in potentially dangerous situation. 
There should also be clear indication of operations, which automation has performed 
and if FLIR sequence has been stopped by an error. Representatives noted that SVV 
has over 300 feeders and therefore single FLIR instance is not efficient enough to handle 
multiple fault situations. FLIR should be able to operate multiple faults simultaneously, 
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for example in the separate fault handling areas, so switching actions do not overlap. 
[58] 
Even though trial switchings must be implemented in the system, the initial data from the 
relay and fault indicators should also be used to determine possible fault area. Repre-
sentatives stated that fault inference according to the measurements and fault indications 
should be the primary method to narrow down the faulted feeder and to reduce unwanted 
trial switchings. The trial switching sequence should first use the bi-section method to 
roughly divide the feeder by expected customer outage costs. After the coarse bi-section, 
rest of the faulty area is located and isolated using the zone-by-zone rolling method. 
FLIR should be able to handle multiple faults occurring in the same feeder. If the circuit 
breaker trips even after the first RCD zone has been isolated by zone-by-zone rolling, 
FLIR should not stop as a malfunction. Instead the second faulted zone should be lo-
cated and isolated by the means of zone-by-zone rolling. [58] 
Usually the operator also verifies the existence of the fault by performing the last trial 
switching against the suspected fault zone, but again it is dependent on the magnitude 
of the fault current and weather conditions. For example, when three-phase short circuit 
fault is located near the substation, high magnitude fault current can cause voltage dip 
also in the adjacent feeders or forest fire in dry season. In these situations, the operator 
usually avoids closing the circuit breaker for verification. [58] To avoid aforementioned 
problems, the last trial should be optional in the feeder level FLIR settings.  
Representatives proposed that after the automation has isolated the faulty RCD zone, 
assisting manual switching sequence would be useful. Usually one RCD zone can in-
clude multiple manual disconnectors and the optimal switching sequence could be cre-
ated with applying the fault inference on the isolated RCD zone. As the isolated remote 
zone covers remarkably smaller area, continuous fault inference could provide more ac-
curate results. Also, optimal manual switching sequence would be beneficial, after the 
exact fault location has been received by a customer call or e.g. helicopter inspection. 
[58] 
The basic principle of the fault clearing process is to locate and isolate the fault before 
restoring the supply to avoid any unnecessary short breaks. Workflow of the whole pro-
cess is mentioned to be more straightforward by these means. However, if specific 
branches can be certainly stated as unfaulty and isolated from the main supply route 
during the isolation process, supply is restored via backup connections. Usually there 
are no restrictions to use adjacent feeder as a backup supply, but operator is using care-
ful consideration e.g. in severe weather conditions when urban feeder is used to supply 
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a rural overhead line branch. There are also important industrial feeders, which are not 
allowed to use as a backup supply in the normal operating conditions. Therefore, a 
feeder level option to block usage as a backup supply should be included in the FLIR 
settings. [58] 
According to the interviewees, automation would be most beneficial during night-time 
when a single remote operator is responsible of the network operation. There have been 
situations when a certain fault has not been noticed by the remote operator. Compre-
hensive situation awareness was mentioned to be crucial especially in a major disturb-
ance. It was noted that during a major disturbance the network control center is manned 
full time and automatic switching actions could even disturb the operation and weaken 
the awareness of overall situation. FLIR could assist the operation by restoring only the 
weather-proof cabled network and then leave the fault for the operator. Hence, the op-
erator has more time to analyse possible fault locations while automation performs the 
first actions. To obtain situational awareness, clear instructions of the performed switch-
ing actions should be provided to ensure seamless takeover for the operator. [58] 
Besides the FLIR functionality, SVV representatives noted that an external tool or report 
for visualizing the overall situation would be useful in a daily network operation and es-
pecially in the major disturbance situation. Therefore, the overall situation according to 
the outages and the overall fault management process could be more easily shared be-
tween the NCC personnel and the management level the DSO. It was proposed that the 
report could visualize the total unconnected power and expected outage costs as a graph 
and forecast the upcoming situation according to the repair estimations set by operators 
and field crews. Additionally, all outages should be listed with real-time information of the 
fault clearing status, or if certain fault are not assigned to any operator or field crew. [58] 
6.2 Kajave Oy 
In 2018 Kajave, former Loiste Sähköverkko Oy, distributed electricity to about 58 400 
customers in the Kainuu Region. Kajave Oy is a distribution system operator of Loiste 
Group, having also operations in electricity generation, district heating, and electricity 
sales. The network control center of Kajave is located in the city of Kajaani. [60] Total 
length of the distribution network is approximately 13 000 km, of which about 3 400 km 
is medium voltage network. Kajave also operates 245 kilometers of 110 kV regional 
transmission network. Cabling rate of the MV network is 9,1 % and 47,7 % in the LV 
network according to the 2018 statistics. Kajave has 654 remote-controlled disconnect-
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ors installed, which is approximately 19 RCDs per 100 km of MV network. [57] Distribu-
tion network area of Kajave Oy according to the web outage map is presented in Figure 
34. 
 
Figure 34. Distribution area of Kajave according to the outage map presenta-
tion [61] 
Kajave differs from other interviewees having a distribution management system pro-
vided by Trimble also including Trimble network information system. As a SCADA sys-
tem, Kajave uses the ABB MicroSCADA Pro SYS600. Kajave already uses the FLIR 
functionality developed through cooperation of Trimble and Netcontrol, in which ABB has 
implemented a FLIR interface to connect Trimble DMS to SYS600. [62]  
The main target for enhancing the distribution reliability in Kajave is renovating the net-
work by cabling, but also the amount of network automation will be significantly in-
creased. Due to heavy snow loads that occurred in recent years, remote-controlled dis-
connector stations and reclosers will be installed especially for long, rural feeders. Be-
sides increasing the amount of cabling and automation, overhead lines have been relo-
cated to road shoulders, and overhead line routes are maintained as wood-proof. Kajave 
has also one disconnector station in 10 kV cabled network equipped with fault indicators, 
but no user experience has been acquired since no faults have been occurred in that 
feeder after the installation. According to the interviewees, reliable fault indicators would 
remarkably improve operation of the FLIR, leaving unnecessary trial switching to a min-
imum. [62] 
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According to the interview, fault location and isolation process of the network control 
center operator varies by the situation, and therefore no exact guidelines besides elec-
trical safety and technical limitations can be determined. It was emphasized that the op-
erators’ experience speeds up the process, but with guidance of the DMS, an unexperi-
enced operator should also be able to operate rather efficiently. The primary information 
used by the operator is the fault distance calculation performed by the DMS, but fault 
current measurements are not always available, or they may be incorrect. Potential fault-
prone areas are not documented in the system, but operator’s knowledge of such areas 
can be helpful when the initial data is not available for fault inference. Representatives 
noted that also AMR alarms are used to deduce the conductor failure in MV network, 
when the relay has not tripped. [62] 
When performing the supply restoration, limitations of the back-feed capability according 
to the short-circuit protection are documented in the SCADA pictures to support the op-
erator. If multiple backup connections are available, the most capable connection is 
used. It was noted that due increasing amount of underground cables, compensation of 
the earth fault current must be considered. If compensation is handled with distributed 
compensation coils in secondary substations, earth fault current compensation may not 
be able to support additional section to be supplied. Whereas, the compensation is han-
dled with automatically adjusting centralized compensation coil in the substation, limits 
of the control unit must be considered.  
Unlike other interviewed DSOs, Kajave has a FLIR functionality in daily use. FLIR solu-
tion is a part of the Trimble DMS and it uses a web service to communicate with Mi-
croSCADA Pro SYS600. [39] The SCADA side functionality is implemented by ABB. The 
automatic fault location, isolation, and supply restoration of Trimble utilizes a trial switch-
ing sequence to support the fault distance calculation. FLIR was noted to be the most 
beneficial during nighttime, since the operation is taken care remotely at home. By these 
means, FLIR sequence can isolate the fault and re-supply healthy zones before the op-
erator has set up the remote system. According to the interview, an average FLIR se-
quence takes approximately 4 minutes, but an experienced operator can perform the 
isolation and supply restoration even faster. Therefore, faults during office hours are pre-
ferred to handle by the network control center operators.  
The FLIR functionality utilizes the fault distance calculation as the primary method for 
fault location. Before the isolation sequence, the first trial switching can be made to en-
sure that fault still occurs in the feeder. The first trial is performed after user defined time 
delay as the final trip of the circuit breaker happens. Thus, the auto-reclosing sequence 
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have already been conducted, and the first trial acts as an additional auto-reclosing. Ac-
cording to the Kajave, high number of faults have been cleared during the time delay 
between final trip and the first trial switching. By these means, time consuming fault iso-
lation sequence can be avoided, and the total outage duration stays under the limit of a 
short outage. [62] If the faulted zone cannot be deduced, FLIR proceeds into a sparse 
roll sequence to roughly determine the faulty area and continues with more precise 
dense roll sequence to isolate the fault in one RCD zone. Whereas one RCD zone can 
be determined as the suspected fault zone, FLIR tries to isolate the suspected zone 
immediately and performs the second trial switching action to ensure the suspected area 
is correct. If the suspected RCD zone is proven to be incorrect, the trial switching se-
quence is applied starting with dense roll sequence. After the faulted RCD zone has been 
isolated, FLIR proceeds into a restoration sequence to restore the unsupplied RCD 
zones with backup connections or from the upstream substation. [39] 
FLIR functionality is configurable to each feeder separately from the settings dialog of 
the SYS600. Depending on the feeder type, settings can be configured to include the 
first trial switching, trial switching sequence, the second trial and if feeder can be used 
as a backup connection. Kajave representative stated that the operator normally does 
not use the first trial, when the fault can be expected to be close to the substation by 
alarming undervoltage detection and high magnitude fault current measurements. In that 
way, unnecessary voltage dip on adjacent feeders and strain to network components 
can be avoided. The FLIR and auto-reclosings are not used in entirely cabled feeders, 
since short-circuit currents are high and the fault reason is usually human-related. 
Thereby, additional switching actions could cause danger to the network equipment and 
potential life threat. [62] 
Comprehensive situation awareness was emphasized to be the key factor for efficient 
fault management especially in the major disturbance situation. Even though FLIR can 
perform the fault isolation process simultaneously for multiple faults, the overall situation 
awareness of the operators is often decreased. Therefore, the FLIR is currently disabled 
during the major disturbance. Trimble FLIR has so called storm mode, in which automa-
tion isolates only the weatherproof part of the network and leaves rest of the fault handled 
by the operator. This operating mode has not yet been tested by the Kajave, because no 
severe weather conditions have been occurred after implementation. [62]  
Due to varying conditions of the major disturbance situation and the current state of au-
tomation, it was speculated that automatizing the whole process will be challenging task 
or even not possible at least in the next decade. It was noted several times during inter-
view, that reliable and straightforward operation of the FLIR is more important than taking 
62 
 
all special situations into account. According to the Kajave representative, there are feed-
ers that does not support the FLIR operation due to old relay technology, but this is 
considered in daily operation. [62] 
6.3 Koilis-Satakunnan Sähkö Oy 
Koilis-Satakunnan Sähkö Oy (KSAT) is a DSO operating in the area including parts of 
Pirkanmaa, South Ostrobothnia and Central Finland regions. Network control center of 
KSAT is located in the city of Virrat. KSAT distributes and sells electricity for about 16 000 
customers according to the 2018 statistics. The total length of the distribution network is 
approximately 4 000 km, of which about 1 600 km is MV network. According to the sta-
tistics of 2018, cabling rate of the MV network is 10,0 % and 36,4 % in the LV network. 
There are approximately 160 remote-controlled disconnectors installed in the distribution 
network, which is about 10 RCDs per 100 km of MV network. [57] KSAT is using the 
whole ABB MicroSCADA Pro product portfolio including DMS600 NE, DMS600 WS and 
SYS600.  
 
Figure 35. Distribution area of the KSAT according to the outage info map 
presentation [63] 
To enhance the distribution reliability, cabling rate and amount of automation is increased 
along with reserve connections for rural feeders. Especially remote reclosers are proven 
to be remarkably beneficial in the boundary of cabled and overhead line feeder. A pilot 
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project for cabled network fault indicators is also on the go, but there is no user experi-
ence yet. Representatives stated that there are not reliable and cost-efficient fault indi-
cator solution for large scale deployment in the market. In addition to the cabling and 
automation, distribution reliability is improved by relocating overhead lines to roadsides 
and maintaining the existing network equipment carefully. According to interviewees, 
whole distribution network will not be cabled due to long distances. There was also a 
mention, that cabled network could still be prone to faults in the agricultural areas having 
lots of excavation. [64] 
The primary information of fault location process performed by the operator is calculated 
fault distance. However, fault current measurements are not usually available, and the 
operator must use the best knowledge about the network. The calculational fault location 
has been working rather well in short circuit faults, but it cannot be used in the case of 
an earth fault. However, earth fault protection trip time is in most cases delayed and 
faults develop into short-circuit faults, which can be located more easily. When there are 
no initial data to be used, operator must use intuition and knowledge about the network. 
Some of the operators have the experience about the most fault prone areas, and certain 
line sections can be prioritized in advance. There is still no efficient way to store the 
information about the environmental hazards, but functionality for that could be beneficial 
according to the representatives. When there are no initial data for the fault location, the 
operator uses commonly the bi-section method at first and after that performs the zone-
by-zone rolling. Supply is also restored during fault isolation process, if certain branches 
can be proven healthy. [64] 
The operator must use careful consideration of using trial switching during dry season, 
when the chance of wildfire is high. According to the interviewees, wildfires due to over-
head line faults occur approximately couple of times during summer. Also, the covered 
overhead line was noted to be limiting factor when utilizing trial switching, since conduc-
tor can be damaged rather easily by high short-circuit currents. Repair work of the cov-
ered overhead line is highly time consuming, and therefore automation should take pos-
sible conductor strain into account. Trial switching must not be utilized in the cabled 
feeders due to potential damage to the underground cable by high short-circuit currents. 
It was also noted that underground cable faults are usually caused by human error, so 
additional switching actions could be deadly dangerous. FLIR functionality was proposed 
to be configurable for each feeder separately. [64] 
SCADA pictures of KSAT include documentation for the backup connection ability to 
restore the adjacent feeder. All in all, loads on the rural feeders are rather small and 
backup connections can re-supply wide portion of the network. If in doubt, operator also 
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checks the constraint violations according to the DMS calculations. It was noted that long 
rural feeders should not be restored by urban feeder especially during severe weather 
conditions. As the urban feeders are mostly cabled, FLIR functionality would not be even 
used, and thus restrictions for supply restoration may not be needed for feeder level 
individually. [64] 
For the remote-controlled switching device communication, KSAT utilizes own radio net-
work. Communication delays were approximated to be from seconds to 30 seconds de-
pending on the location of the RCD. Varying terrain and long distances set challenges 
for the communication and controllability of single pole-mounted RCDs in the rural areas. 
It was noted that all switch operations are not transmitted by the first try, but operator 
sometimes needs to perform switching action multiple times before RCD operates. Trial 
switching sequence of the FLIR is desired to try controlling the switch multiple times, 
before interrupting the sequence. If the position indication is not received after multiple 
attempts or switch is indicated to be in abnormal position, sequence should be aborted 
to avoid possible electrical safety risks. [64] 
The network control center of KSAT is not manned full time, so the FLIR is supposed to 
be most beneficial at night, when operation is carried remotely from home. According to 
the interviewees, the FLIR sequence could locate and isolate the fault simultaneously as 
the operator prepares the laptop setup and takes the remote connections to the DMS 
and SCADA. Also, if the operator is not directly besides the remote setup, the response 
time can even increase without automation participating in the process. It is crucial that 
FLIR gives the operator a clear guidance of the operations performed. Also, possible 
malfunctions, such as communication or software errors should be informed to the oper-
ator. Thereby, the operator is instantly ready to take over the responsibility of the fault 
clearing process and the situation awareness is maintained. [64] 
Like in other interviewed DSOs, the situation awareness was emphasized to be crucial 
in major disturbance situation. As the switching state can vary significantly from the nor-
mal state, automation is supposed to disturb the actions carried out by the operator. 
Automatic switching actions could also cause electrical safety risk, when high number of 
field crews are dispatched around the network in challenging conditions. In major dis-
turbance situation, FLIR can operate as an assisting tool for the operator while determin-
ing the possible fault locations. It was also noted that after automation has been con-
firmed to reliably operate in normal conditions, also disturbance situations could be par-
tially handled using autonomous operation of FLIR. [64] 
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Representatives of KSAT emphasized that user interface of the FLIR functionality must 
be uncluttered and simple to use. Operators are using varying setups from large wide 
screens of a control center to a small laptop when the operator is on duty at home. Inter-
viewees noted that rather straightforward logic of the FLIR is preferred than all-encom-
passing solution to every special situation. While variety sources of open data are avail-
able to be used in fault inference, processing and storing the massive amounts of data 
is assumed to weaken the overall performance of the system. [64] 
6.4 Summary of the interviews 
During the interview process, several functional requirements and development needs 
were gathered. All the interviewees noted that the overall situation awareness of the 
network should be maintained even though automation participates in the fault manage-
ment process. Currently major disturbance situations are preferred to handle by the op-
erating personnel of the network control center due to varying and unusual conditions. 
According to the interviewed DSOs, FLIR is the most beneficial during nighttime when 
network operation is carried out by remote operators at home. To achieve fluent opera-
tion between automation and the operator, FLIR should inform the user of the performed 
actions and point out possible malfunctions or errors.  
According to the interviews, distribution system operators are utilizing various resources 
to meet the distribution reliability requirements by the year 2028. While the network ren-
ovation by underground cables and increasing the level of automation tends to be the 
key method, it is not economically feasible for all rural feeders. DSOs are additionally 
maintaining overhead line routes as wood-proof and moving overhead lines besides road 
shoulders. The current fault indicator technology was stated not to be reliable or cost-
efficient enough for large scale deployment, but pilot projects are carried out mainly in 
underground cable network to find the suitable solution. Distributed energy resources 
enhancing the distribution reliability were not considered yet among the interviewed 
DSOs, since distribution system operators are not allowed to own DER units. 
General opinion of the DSOs was that automation can perform trial switching inde-
pendently, because it is the common and usually the only way to isolate the fault also by 
the human operator. Normally operator determines a remote-controlled disconnector that 
coarsely isolates the fault either feeder upstream or downstream. After the coarse isola-
tion, zone-by-zone rolling method is applied. In case of a short feeder, trial switching 
process can be also carried out by performing straight zone-by-zone rolling from the 
substation. Determining the coarse isolation disconnector is based on operator’s 
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knowledge of the prevailing conditions and experience about the most fault prone areas. 
If available, fault distance calculations are used to narrow down the suspected area. 
Therefore, the optimal coarse isolation switch is challenging task to determine by auto-
mation without any initial data available. Occasionally, the operator closes the circuit 
breaker after the auto-reclosing sequence to ensure the fault is still active. However, this 
is highly dependent on the prevailing situation due to possible equipment failures, so 
according to the interviews verifying trial switching should be optional in the feeder level 
settings.  
Manner of supply restoration also varies by the operator. While some of the operators 
first locate and isolate the faulty remote-controlled zone, others restore the supply during 
isolation process. The common way according to the DSO interviews, tend to be supply 
restoration during isolation process if certain feeder branch can be stated as un-faulted 
and re-energized from the adjacent feeder. By these means, restored branch must be 
isolated from the main supply route to avoid additional short break caused by trial switch-
ing process. Operator uses careful consideration, when supply will be restored via 
backup connection. Backup connection may be ranked out by important industrial cus-
tomer or high number of customers, even if technical constraints are not violated. By 
these means, feeder level setting should include option to disallow use as a backup sup-
ply. During severe weather conditions more than one fault can occur in the feeder and 
especially urban feeders shall not be used in the supply restoration for fault prone rural 
feeders. FLIR functionality should include mode, which requires confirmation by the op-
erator before restoration sequence is applied.  
To ensure the electrical safety among the network, FLIR should be easily configurable 
to each feeder separately. Trial switching should be easily disabled from a certain feeder 
with maintenance work e.g. during a tree clearance besides the overhead line. In these 
situations, also auto-reclosing sequence is disabled. Interviewees proposed that auto-
matic trial switching should be automatically disabled, when the auto-reclosing is 
switched off. However, maintenance outage, where working crew is not in contact with 
live network, should not normally prevent the use of trial switching in the feeder. When 
the maintenance outage is carried out according to the electrical safety rules, switches 
are locked out to prevent unwanted re-energization and work earthing is set up. FLIR 
cannot operate these locked switches and thus no hazardous situations were consid-
ered.  
Communication to remote-controlled switching devices was stated rather reliable espe-
cially in disconnector stations having multiple RCDs installed. Single pole-mounted dis-
connectors along the rural feeders need sometimes couple of control actions to operate 
67 
 
due to long distances and varying terrain. Disconnectors are inspected regularly to avoid 
malfunctions and equipment failures. Communication delays are said to be approxi-
mately from couple of seconds to 30 seconds before status indication is received. DSO 
representatives noted that automation should try to operate switching device couple of 
times before aborting the sequence. If position indication of the switching device is not 
received after control attempts, or switch is indicated to be in abnormal or faulty position, 
switching sequence should be aborted and handed over to operator to avoid risk in elec-
trical safety.  
Because of the varying conditions and different levels of network automation, all-encom-
passing solution of the FLIR is too complex to operate reliably in daily use. According to 
the all interviewees, the functional implementation should rather straightforward at least 
in the first production version. After the first implementation is proven to operate reliably 
in daily use, more sophisticated inference methods utilizing e.g. open data and fault his-
tory could be added.  
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7. IMPROVEMENTS TO FLIR FUNCTIONALITY 
According to the DSO interviews, the key improvements to the FLIR functionality are a 
trial switching sequence, simple and easy to use interface, and different level of config-
uration of the FLIR. The FLIR should also be able to handle multiple faults simultaneously 
in separate geographical areas. Especially at the first stage, FLIR is desired to be as 
simple as possible to reduce the system side errors. DSO representatives noted that a 
reliable and a rather simple operation is more important than full coverage of all special 
situations. By these means, the basic functionality of the FLIR sequence can be proven 
to operate reliably and efficiently with current penetration of network automation.  
In the future development of the fault management, more sophisticated methods and 
data sources may be used. An increasing amount of distributed energy resources with 
two-way communication infrastructure could be used to coordinate micro grids automat-
ically during the supply restoration sequence. Improved protection and fault indicators 
may also enable better fault location functionalities to avoid unnecessary trial switching. 
Widely available open data, such as weather forecasts, forest height data, and road vec-
tor data, could also improve fault inference in the future [65]. External tool for open data 
processing should be developed, because processing large amounts of data would most 
probably lead to performance issues in DMS600 and thus disturb the real-time operation 
of the network.  
Also, some minor improvements that were noted during the DSO interviews are intro-
duced. All the interviewed DSOs mentioned that a tool for maintaining and visualizing 
potentially fault prone line sections could be used to assist FLIR functionality and the 
operator in locating the fault. This feature was chosen for a closer inspection because 
existing functionalities of the DMS600 could be rather easily utilized in the development 
of the feature. Altogether, better visualization of the network status should be readily 
available to enhance the overall situation awareness during disturbance situations.  
This chapter provides and analyses different kind of functionalities and solutions required 
by the customer. Motivation of the functional description is to provide useful information 
to MicroSCADA Pro research and development team for the implementation of the fea-
ture. Methods for determining automatic switching actions during trial switching se-
quence are presented based on information gathered from DSO interviews and literature 
review. List of functional specifications is presented in the Appendix C. 
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7.1 Evaluation of the trial switching method 
To avoid unnecessary strain to the network components and speed up the trial switching 
sequence, switching actions must be optimized correctly. Additionally, harmful short in-
breaks to customers during the isolation process must be minimized. [50] When the NCC 
operator is utilizing the trial switching procedure, decision of the switching sequence is 
usually based on intuition or operators’ knowledge about surrounding conditions [58, 62, 
64]. Modeling of this kind of knowledge-based information is a troublesome task, and it 
would require e.g. advanced neural network applications and massive amounts of data 
[44]. Since FLIR functionality is desired to operate even without initial data of the fault, 
decision making process must be based on the data associated to the distribution net-
work model, such as: 
• Conductor length and cabling ratio 
• Number of customers and connected power 
• Availability of backup connections 
The bi-section method requires feeder to be divided into approximately two equally sized 
parts in terms of disconnector zone length or probability of the faults. Bi-section method 
is usually preferred method in manual isolation process due to slow moving time of the 
field crews. Decision making based on the physical lengths of the remote-controlled 
zones are usually not viable due to e.g. underground cable being less prone to faults 
compared to overhead line and modern communication allowing switching actions within 
seconds. [12] Topology of the feeder is also varying as the densely populated areas tend 
to have multiple remote-controlled branching points with open backup connections, but 
rural parts of the feeder are more straightforward with less network automation installed. 
Therefore, the term bi-section method is sometimes obsolete and rather coarse trial 
switching method can be used. To minimize the circuit breaker trips, disconnector should 
be chosen in a way that fault can be most likely stated to locate in the downstream di-
rection of the chosen RCD. 
There are three possible outcomes after the feeder is coarsely isolated. If the substation 
circuit breaker trips, fault is located in the upstream direction from the isolating RCD. 
Whereas, the circuit breaker stays closed fault can be either located in the downstream 
direction from the isolating RCD or the fault has cleared by itself. Fault may be cleared 
by itself e.g. when tree branch has ignited and fallen off from the overhead line after the 
short-circuit [4]. Depending on the prevailing conditions, operator occasionally performs 
additional trial for the entire feeder to ensure the fault is still active. Deploying the first 
trial may cause unnecessary trip and additional stress to network components especially 
in the mixed feeders, containing both overhead line, underground cable and covered 
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overhead line. The first trial would enhance the overall performance of FLIR, but accord-
ing to interviews, it should be optionally enabled for feeders.  
Efficiency of the coarse trial is significantly improved, if at least estimation of the fault 
area can be deduced. Thereby, coarse isolation can be performed in a way that the first 
isolation does not cause the circuit breaker to trip, and certain branches can be restored 
and isolated from the main supply route via adjacent feeders. Figure 36 presents an 
example situation, where fault distances can be calculated on two separate branches. 
Both suspected branches can be isolated from the upstream direction by using remote-
controlled switches at station Z9 marked with red borders in the figure. Step by step 
example of the isolation and restoration sequence is described in the Appendix D. RCD 
stations are often equipped with more reliable communication compared to individual 
pole-mounted RCDs along the line, and coarse isolation sequence is preferred to exe-
cute by these means [39].   
 
 
Figure 36. Example of determining the coarse isolation switches according to 
calculated fault distances 
Coarse estimation utilizes the calculated fault distances as the primary source of deter-
mining the opened RCDs. If fault distance calculations are not available, the DMS600 
WS fault inference can be used to calculate the RCD zones, which are most likely not 
faulty. As described in the chapter 5.2.1, the fault inference utilizes fault indicator opera-
tions, conductor types and overloading of components to deduce likelihoods to each 
manual and remote disconnector zone. Figure 37 presents the determination of coarse 
isolation switch based on likelihood calculation.  
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Figure 37. Example of determining the coarse isolation switches according to 
fault inference likelihoods 
Likelihood of the fault occurring in the overhead line is highest during severe weather 
conditions and after heavy snowfall. Therefore, variable of cabling ratio should be 
weighted according to the prevailing situation. Although weather data sets, such as wind 
speed and direction, temperature and cumulative snowfall, provided by the Finnish Me-
teorological Institute [66] are available, acquisition and processing high amounts of data 
could turn out as a bottleneck for performance and system disc usage. Currently fault 
inference parameters must be set by the user as presented in the chapter 5.2.1.  
If coarse isolation switches cannot be determined, coarse isolation sequence moves to 
zone-by-zone rolling method beginning from the substation. By these means, more 
straightforward logic can be obtained, and additional trips can be minimized. Flowchart 
of the proposed coarse isolation sequence is presented in the Figure 38.  
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Figure 38. Flowchart of the coarse isolation logic with suspected fault area de-
termined 
After the coarse isolation switches have been determined and opened, the upstream is 
re-energized. If the circuit breaker trips, fault can be stated to be between substation and 
the isolating switches, and thereby downstream of the feeder can be restored via avail-
able backup connections. Zone-by-zone rolling method is applied to the upstream part 
to minimize additional trips. Whereas the circuit breaker stays closed, fault is located 
behind the coarse isolation switches and trial switching sequence is continued with zone-
by-zone rolling starting from the RCD station. To minimize the customers affected to 
additional short break in the re-energized upstream, RCD branches with backup connec-
tion are supplied from adjacent feeders and isolated from the main supply route.  
In the upstream branch restoration, temporary loop connection is formed until the branch 
can be isolated from the main supply route. If backup connection is supplied from the 
other substation, capability of parallel operation of primary transformers must be 
checked. The parallel operation of primary transformer requires that phasor groups, 
short-circuit impedances and voltage ratios are equal and rated powers do not exceed 
ratio of 3:1. [67]  
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Zone-by-zone rolling is applied after the coarse isolation sequence. As described in the 
chapter 4.1.3, remote-controlled zones are re-energized one by one until the circuit 
breaker trips. Utilizing zone-by-zone rolling method manually with help of the field crews 
is usually time-consuming task, but with automation single switching action can be con-
ducted within seconds. Zone-by-zone rolling method also reduces the possible number 
of circuit breaker trips to one, if only single fault occurs in the feeder. Like mentioned 
earlier, distribution network feeders are usually branched, and individual branch can con-
tain several RCD zones. To minimize total outage costs and number of short breaks for 
customers, switching actions should be optimized in a way that as much customers as 
possible can be restored via backup connections during zone-by-zone rolling method.  
 
Figure 39. Flowchart of the zone-by-zone rolling method 
In the proposed zone-by-zone rolling method, branches in RCD station are prioritized 
according to available backup connection and estimated customer outage costs. When 
the zone-by-zone rolling sequence has multiple branches to try, one with the largest es-
timated outage costs with backup connection is trajected first. If whole branch is exam-
ined and supply can be restored via open backup connection, supply shall be restored, 
and branch isolated from the main supply route.  
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After the fault has been isolated to a single remote-controlled disconnector zone, RCD 
zones can be restored from the feeding substation or via backup connections, if availa-
ble. Constraint violations are calculated by the DMS and if limits are exceeded, backup 
connection is not used. If there are multiple backup connections available, DMS deter-
mines the most capable in terms of load flow and protection analysis.  
7.2 DMS600 WS FLIR functionality 
Current fault isolation and restoration mode of the DMS600 WS is based on determining 
one faulty RCD zone in the faulted feeder. That requires either accurate fault current 
measurement acquired from the relay or reliable fault indicator operations. According to 
the interviews, initial data is rarely available, or it is not precise enough to locate the fault. 
Therefore, the trial switching sequence must be introduced alongside the fault inference 
of the current fault management. Existing fault inference and fault distance calculation of 
the DMS600 can be used to prevent the unwanted trial switching or help to narrow down 
the suspected fault area. In case of a long feeder with multiple branches, fault inference 
could point out definitely un-faulted zones to be restored. Thereby, number of long out-
ages can be reduced as the interruption time of the restored customers stays under 3-
minute limit.  
The FLIR should be able to handle multiple simultaneous faults. Interviews noted that 
already widespread distribution areas are becoming even larger as the network opera-
tion of several DSOs tend to be centralized into shared network control centers. There-
fore, several FLIR instances should be able to simultaneously operate in separate fault 
handling areas. With individual FLIR areas, there would not be chance of multiple FLIR 
sequences trying to operate the common switching device and potentially interrupt the 
isolation and restoration sequences. Area model would also allow a better controllability 
as certain areas could be assigned to automation and others to the NCC operator to 
handle. Options for FLIR area definition tools are: 
• DMS600 area component, which allows the operator to outline boundaries on the 
geographical network view 
• Dynamic regions defined for primary transformer 
• Network fed by certain primary substation or user defined list of substations dy-
namically according to the switching state 
The area component model requires the administrative user to define the geographical 
boundaries around the remote-controlled switching devices used in the FLIR instance of 
a certain fault handling area. Therefore, FLIR areas should be manually updated when 
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the normal switching state of the network changes. This model would be suitable for 
rather small distribution areas but updating the area components could be too complex 
in larger distribution networks. 
Region model is designed for dividing the network operations to individual operators with 
different level of user permissions. The region is defined as an attribute of a primary 
transformer and it is dynamically updated to the network components according to the 
network topology. Region model allows the management of control rights according to 
the user groups of the DMS600, but it could also be used to assign individual FLIR in-
stances to a certain region. [52] To prevent possible user errors, only one FLIR instance 
should be possible to attach to one region.  
One possible solution for creating the area model is to use a user defined group of pri-
mary substations. Likewise, in the region model, the boundaries of the FLIR area are 
formed dynamically according to the switching state of the distribution network. In this 
model, the user creates a FLIR operating area and defines which substations are in-
cluded. Attaching a substation into multiple area models should be not allowed to prevent 
overlapping actions. Proposed control hierarchy of the FLIR area model is presented in 
the Figure 40. 
 
 
Figure 40. Settings hierarchy of the FLIR area model with an example config-
uration 
 
76 
 
Interviews noted that each of the feeder should be individually configurable to be used 
in the FLIR sequence. For example, trial switching sequence should not be used in the 
cabled feeders and usage of the trials with mixed feeders varies among the DSOs. Cer-
tain feeder can also contain important customers, such as large-scale industry, and thus 
cannot be used as a backup feeder. [58, 62, 64] According to the interviews, feeder level 
settings should include at least: 
• Is FLIR enabled? 
• Is trial switching sequence enabled? 
• Can feeder be used as a backup connection? 
• Additional trial switching to confirm faulty zone after isolation 
Feeder level settings are disabled by default and must be configured by the user when 
new feeder is added to the system. Thus, configuration errors of the system can be re-
duced and unwanted operation of the FLIR to be avoided. E.g. FLIR with trial switching 
sequence enabled, can cause damage to the network equipment in the underground 
cable feeders.  
General settings include option for the overall FLIR functionality to be switched on or 
operated in a disturbance mode. According to the DSO interviews, additional disturbance 
mode should restrict certain features of automatic fault isolation and restoration mode. 
Disturbance mode should try to isolate the fault and restore the supply from the feeding 
primary substation but controlling of the reserve connections should be prevented not to 
disturb actions of the operator or cause outages to adjacent feeders. Settings are inher-
ited from general settings towards feeder level settings, to maintain better controllability 
of the system.  
There should also be an option to allow trial switching according to time of the day. The 
trial switching sequence could be allowed to operate only at nighttime when field crews 
are not operating among the distribution network. By these means, the network control 
center can maintain electrical safety more easily. Additionally, the FLIR would not disturb 
the operator if the trial switching sequence is disabled during office hours.  
Before the trial switching sequence is executed, DMS600 WS determines remote con-
trolled switching devices of the faulty feeder to be reserved for the FLIR sequence. 
DMS600 WS then sends the list of switches for SYS600 to check controllability. If 
switches are interlocked, communication cannot be confirmed or the status indication is 
not up to date, FLIR leaves the switch out of the sequence. While the FLIR sequence is 
running, control of the switches must be restricted from the user. By these means, the 
human operator cannot accidentally perform switching actions to interrupt the sequence. 
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To avoid misunderstanding, control dialog should have a clear indication about reserva-
tion to the FLIR sequence. To obtain more explicit visualization of the trial switching se-
quence, the reserved switches can be highlighted in the network view of the Workstation 
and in the single line diagram of the SCADA picture. Example of the reserved switching 
device visualization is presented in the Figure 41. 
 
 
Figure 41. Example of visualizing the RCDs reserved for the FLIR sequence  
According to the all interviewed DSOs and attendees of the workshop, usability of the 
FLIR control and settings dialog is highly important. User interface must include a clear 
indication whether FLIR is running or not and which actions have been executed. Also, 
errors during sequence must be clearly visible with an explanation of the malfunction. 
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Operation dialog of the FLIR should also include an easy to operate kill switch, if auto-
mation needs to be stopped by the operator. Example of the FLIR dialog is presented in 
the Figure 42.  
 
Figure 42. Example design of the FLIR settings dialog 
Settings dialog should clearly indicate substations and feeders that are included in the 
FLIR functionality. If proposed area model is used, substations included in the certain 
area must be also indicated e.g. with different color or area drop down menu. To achieve 
better usability, feeder level settings should be configurable without stopping the overall 
FLIR functionality. Therefore, FLIR settings should be stored e.g. into the SQL database 
rather than flat configuration file. 
7.2.1 Fault inference 
After the DMS has created a new fault case, all the available data, such as fault current 
measurement and fault indicator operations, are used to inference the possible faulted 
RCD zones. If the fault can be determined to be in a single remote disconnector zone, 
fault can be directly isolated without network straining trial switching. When the fault has 
been isolated, substation circuit breaker is closed. If CB stays closed, fault has been 
successfully isolated, and the trial switching sequence can be avoided. Whereas the 
circuit breaker trips, fault inference can be stated incorrect and FLIR starts to execute 
the trial switching sequence.  
Prevailing conditions affect the fault inference by weighting e.g. fault likelihood in over-
head line compared to underground cable. Current fault inference logic requires weight 
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parameters to be manually set by the operator. According to the interviews, the operator 
rarely has time or attention to adjust the parameters due to high workload especially in 
the disturbance situation. To obtain more straightforward approach, disturbance mode 
of the FLIR could determine the weatherproof cabled portion of the feeder to be restored 
from the upstream direction.  
Several manually controlled disconnector zones may exist in isolated RCD zone, espe-
cially in a long rural feeder. The isolation process is continued by the operator dispatch-
ing field crews to conduct switchings of manually controlled disconnectors that can be 
time consuming due to long distances and challenging terrain. More precise fault infer-
ence using only the isolated RCD zone as an entity, and manual disconnector zone are 
evaluated against one remote-zone.  
7.2.2 Isolation and restoration sequence using trial switching 
If there are no initial data available or fault inference function cannot determine faulty 
zone, trial switching sequence is applied. The first step of the trial switching sequence is 
to determine the coarse isolation. After the faulted feeder has been coarsely divided, 
more precise isolation methods is applied by means of zone-by-zone rolling. In case of 
a lengthy feeder, after the coarse method the suspected fault zone may contain multiple 
RCD zones and branches, so the execution time of the sequence may affect to the over-
all feasibility. Execution time of the zone-by-zone rolling can be reduced, if remote-con-
trolled zones can be further merged, e.g. by first experimenting remote-controlled dis-
connector stations at branching points. Proposed FLIR sequence is presented in the 
Figure 43. 
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Figure 43. Proposed trial switching sequence 
As the overall FLIR functionality is desired to be straightforward according to interviewed 
DSO representatives, proposed logic utilizes three different initial conditions: 
1. Exact fault location determined by fault distance calculation. 
2. Several suspected faulty zones by fault distance calculations or fault inference. 
3. Faulty area cannot be determined.  
When a single RCD zone can be stated as faulty, a switching sequence is created to 
isolate the zone. After the isolation, supply is restored to the feeder upstream and if circuit 
breaker stays closed, fault isolation can be stated correct. Additional trial switching can 
be performed against the isolated RCD zone, to confirm the suspected fault. If the fault 
can be successfully isolated to the single RCD zone, supply is restored also to feeder 
downstream via backup connections. Whereas the circuit breaker trips, fault isolation 
can be stated as failed and FLIR sequence continues with zone-by-zone rolling starting 
from the substation. 
If several suspected faulty zones are available, FLIR should try to determine RCDs to 
coarsely isolate all suspected faulty zones as described in the chapter 7.1. After the 
coarse isolation, zone-by-zone rolling is applied either from coarse isolation RCDs or 
from the substation depending on the circuit breaker trip. Zone-by-zone rolling should 
81 
 
prioritize branches including backup connections and largest estimated customer outage 
costs, so as much as customers can be resupplied during isolation sequence. If faulty 
area and coarse isolation switch cannot be determined, zone-by-zone rolling is applied 
from the substation to avoid unnecessary trips.  
The whole trial switching sequence cannot be determined beforehand, because the next 
step depends on tripping of the circuit breaker. Therefore, sequence should be created 
dynamically during runtime or determine all possible situations considering whether the 
circuit breaker trips after certain RCD switching action. Figure 44 presents an example 
path of zone-by-zone rolling, where the execution depends on the trip of the circuit 
breaker. 
 
Figure 44. Structure of trial switching sequence 
In the switching model, every disconnector switching action branches to two different 
options decided by the circuit breaker trip. If entire sequence can be executed without 
the circuit breaker trip, fault can be stated as cleared by itself and supply can be restored 
from the feeder upstream.  
After the fault has been isolated and supply has been restored to the feeder upstream 
and to the healthy RCD zones via backup connections, fault is left for operator to handle. 
Manual isolation sequence is created to assist operator, if fault inference can point out 
possible faulty manual zones. Also, a switching sequence to restore the switching state 
to pre-fault situation or to the normal switching state is created for the operator to exe-
cute.  
7.3 Additional improvements and future consideration 
Besides the FLIR functionality, some features supporting the fault management were 
pointed out during DSO interviews. When the operator is performing fault isolation pro-
cess, time and available workspace is usually limited and thus analyzing the prevailing 
conditions may not be possible. According to the interviews, tool for documenting and 
82 
 
maintaining data of fault prone areas would improve the fault inference and fault man-
agement of the network control center operator. Example of the functionality is presented 
in the chapter 7.3.1. 
Also, better utilization of available open data could be used to support the fault inference 
of the DMS600. Open data including e.g. weather forecasts and terrain conditions allows 
Ministry of Finance conducted The Finnish Open Data Program during years 2013 – 
2015 to accelerate availability of the data sources by public sector. Target of the program 
was open data sources to machine-readable format and harmonize the terms of use by 
the means of JHS 189 ‘License for use of open data’. [68] Machine readable open data 
could be automatically processed with external tool and saved to network database to 
support fault inference of DMS600, or to be visualized for operator.  
Although, distributed energy resources are not yet in wide consideration of distribution 
system operators, amount of DER units are constantly increasing, and second genera-
tion of AMR infrastructure should provide better controllability [69]. Smart Grid Working 
Group mandated by the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment stated in its final 
report that DSO should not own or use electricity storages by themselves, but if there 
are no suitable market driven service available, distribution system operator could own 
and use electricity storages for example improving the distribution reliability. [70] There-
fore, distribution system operator could enhance the distribution reliability especially at 
the end of long rural feeder having no backup connections.  
7.3.1 Hazardous line sections 
During the DSO interviews, it was considered that potentially fault prone line sections 
could be documented in the system to enhance the fault inference. For example, over-
head lines located in the forest vulnerable to high wind, or heavy snow loads or cables 
prone to excavation could be documented geographically into the system. Automatic 
fault location function could then use the information to deduce the potential faulty zone. 
The coloring mode could also be used to assist operator to determine the fault location.  
Requirements for the functionality were straightforward operation and effortless visuali-
zation of the data. There should also be option to disable the feature from the fault infer-
ence, if the data is outdated. Weight of the line parameter of environmental hazard could 
be adjustable by certainty factors in DMS600 WS fault inference logic. Environment haz-
ard classes need to be configurable by the user. By these means, the Code info defini-
tions can be utilized to store these variables, since the administrator user can modify 
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these from the DMS600 general settings. Table 2 presents the structure of the Codeinfo 
SQL table and example classes defined. 
Table 2. Hazard classes in the Codeinfo SQL table 
INFOTYPE CODE INFO 
ENVIRONMENT_HAZARD 1 Forest 
ENVIRONMENT_HAZARD 2 Excavation 
ENVIRONMENT_HAZARD 3 Faulty network equipment 
The information of the hazardous line section is kept updated with DMS600 Network 
Editor or it can be imported with network data from an external network information sys-
tem. Environment hazard is defined as a MV line section attribute and updating the value 
can be done by using the MV Section dialog in DMS600 NE. Even though single line 
section may cover geographically long distance, it is still narrowed down to a certain 
disconnector zone. As the DMS600 supports mass update for line sections, certain at-
tribute can be updated to several line sections at once, which reduces the amount of 
work need to be done. Example modifications to the dialog are described in the Figure 
45.  
 
Figure 45. Environmental hazard addition to the MV Section data form of 
DMS600 NE 
As presented in the Figure 45, type of the hazard can be selected from the drop-down 
menu of the MV section dialog. Alongside rather trivial information of the hazard type, 
free text definition can be attached to the certain attribute. Free text information may 
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contain e.g. excavation work schedule or detailed information of forest conditions, prin-
cipally for keeping the documentation updated. The hazard attribute could also include 
date interval to specify the validity of the data. After the time stamp of the hazard has 
expired, attribute could be automatically deleted, or user could be informed to maintain 
the information. This would enhance the documentation process and the validity of the 
data.  
Visualization of the hazardous line sections can be turned on from the tool bar of 
DMS600 NE and WS, to be used for documentation and guidance in network operation. 
When the visualization is turned on, line sections with hazard documented are high-
lighted in the main network window. Different classes are visualized with separate colors 
and the class definitions are visible in the topology legend. Figure 46 presents the main 
network window and topology legend, with environmental hazard coloring mode enabled.  
 
Figure 46. Highlight coloring of the line sections with environmental hazard 
value documented 
To specify the information related to certain MV line section, free data object or DMS600 
WS note object can be attached to the specific geographical location. Geographical note 
is beneficial, when the operator is dispatching field crews to isolate the fault by manually 
controlled disconnectors or locating the fault by field inspection. Free object can also 
contain text label to provide detailed information about the situation when the network 
window is zoomed. Example of the free object placement is presented in Figure 47.   
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Figure 47. DMS600 WS note attached to the line section 
Due to changing nature of the environmental conditions, documentation of the line sec-
tions to the system may be time consuming and the data can easily be outdated. Accord-
ing to the DSO interviews, inspections and information of the potential environmental 
hazards may not be received from the actuators in the field or due to lack of manpower 
inspections may not be documented [58, 62, 64]. Therefore, proper communication be-
tween the DSO, contractors and municipalities must be obtained. Also, during occasional 
condition inspection of line sections and network components, inspection crews could 
update the information with handheld devices.  
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8. CONCLUSIONS 
While distribution networks are becoming more complex and high distribution reliability 
is required, automatic functions in daily operation must be introduced. Especially rural 
distribution network operators do not have the possibility to ensure a fully weatherproof 
network due to sparsely populated distribution areas, at least in next few decades. Ac-
cording to the DSO interviews, utilization of the existing and constantly increasing 
amount of network automation with advanced algorithms is seen as one of the key de-
velopment needs in the near future. The distribution management system along with 
SCADA provides a powerful platform to implement centralized automation, since the 
switching state and the topology of the whole distribution network can be analyzed and 
controlled without high penetration of expensive local automation. This thesis focuses on 
the demand for the Finnish rural DSOs having long overhead line feeders, and thus the 
centralized automation is taken into inspection.  
Automatic fault location, isolation, and supply restoration (FLIR) functionality streamlines 
the fault management process by relieving the workload of the network control center 
operators and improves the efficiency of the fault clearing process. Though FLIR does 
not affect the number of faults, the total outage duration and thereby the customer outage 
costs can be decreased. According to the interviews and the literature review, the FLIR 
is most beneficial at night when the network control center is not full-time operated, and 
the operation is carried out by a remote operator at home. In that case, automation can 
carry out or partially execute the fault isolation and supply restoration process before the 
remote operator is ready to take actions.  
During major disturbance situations, DSOs are operating the network with a larger, spe-
cially trained organization full time. Due to unusual conditions and multiple simultaneous 
faults all over the distribution area, the overall situation awareness is emphasized to be 
extremely important. DSO interviews pointed out that conventional FLIR solution, where 
automation takes care of the switching operations and supply restoration, may not be 
beneficial during these conditions. Especially when the switching state of the distribution 
network is unusual and multiple operators are controlling the network, automation is not 
wanted to disturb the process and vice versa. A major disturbance FLIR solution is rather 
preferred to be assisting function providing visualization and optimal switching se-
quences to operator for execution. One proposed method to accomplish a fluent opera-
tion during a disturbance situation is to determine certain operating areas where the FLIR 
is allowed to operate without disturbing the switching actions performed by operators.  
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The current version of ABB MicroSCADA Pro DMS600 distribution management system 
already includes solution for automatic fault isolation and supply restoration, which yet is 
not feasible enough according the DSOs. Since the functionality is solely based on a 
fault distance calculation and fault inference e.g. by fault indicators, high number of faults 
cannot be managed due to lack of initial data. In Finnish distribution networks, where the 
neutral is isolated or compensated, earth faults cannot be located by fault distance cal-
culation due to low magnitude fault currents. Also fault indicators have been discovered 
to be too unreliable and expensive for large scale deployment. Therefore, the operator 
usually performs trial switching, where a substation circuit breaker is closed against a 
suspected fault, disconnector zone one by one. Combining the current fault inference by 
relay measurements and fault indicator data with trial switching sequence will improve 
the performance of the FLIR solution as larger number of faults can be handled.  
The main objective for this thesis was to gather development needs and ideas for the 
FLIR functionality by conducting semi-structured interviews for Finnish DSOs operating 
in rural distribution areas. Motivation of the research was to gather information and basic 
principles of MV network fault isolation and supply restoration performed by the human 
operator and find out the most important requirements and restrictions for the function-
ality. The interviews also included general description of the actions taken to meet the 
tightening distribution reliability requirements. The interview process produced a variety 
of development needs and ideas, of which introducing the trial switching sequence along-
side the current fault inference and simultaneous execution of FLIR cases were the most 
desired. The research also pointed out that easy configurability and straightforward user 
interface were the key elements in a comprehensive solution. The most important devel-
opment needs and ideas have been taken into closer examination and written down for 
the research and development team of MicroSCADA Pro DMS600.  
Constantly developing distribution automation and increasing penetration of distributed 
energy resources provide a possibility for more comprehensive automation solutions. 
Two-way communication between customer automation and DER allows a feeder load 
flow to be reconfigured to support supply restoration via backup feeders. Centralized 
communication with microgrid controllers enables fast supply restoration to rural areas 
where backup connections cannot be utilized. While multiple communication flows and 
an increasing amount of data are introduced to the system, more sophisticated data 
management tools and algorithms, such as neural networks and genetic algorithms must 
be considered to improve the efficiency of automatic fault management.  
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APPENDIX A: THE CURRENT PROCESS FLOW 
OF THE AUTOMATIC FAULT ISOLATION AND 
RESTORATION SEQUENCE 
 
The process flow of the Automatic Fault Isolation and Restoration mode in Mi-
croSCADA Pro DMS600 [11] 
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APPENDIX B: QUESTIONNAIRE FOR CUSTOMER 
INTERVIEWS 
1. Basic information about the distribution network 
a. Present the length of the distribution network and cabling degree. How 
much is the relation between networks locating in the town plan area ver-
sus rural area? 
 
b. How much remote-controlled disconnectors and sectionalizing circuit 
breakers are installed in the network? 
 
c. Have fault detectors been installed in the network? If so, how reliable do 
you consider the operation during a fault? 
 
d. Is there any distributed generation or energy resources capable of is-
landed operation or supporting the supply restoration? 
 
e. What are the future plans to enhance the distribution reliability? 
 
2. Automatic functionalities 
a. How beneficial you consider the automatic fault isolation and supply res-
toration in different situations: single fault, multiple simultaneous faults 
and major power disruption? (Day / Night) 
 
b. In your opinion, is automation allowed to perform trial switchings inde-
pendently? 
 
c. Is automation allowed to perform supply restoration independently utiliz-
ing backup connections?  
 
d. In what situations automatic functionalities should be restricted of fully 
prevented? 
 
3. Describe the fault location, isolation and supply restoration performed by 
the operator 
a. Fault Location 
 
i. According to the current situation, how often is the fault possible 
to locate accurately? Do you consider the location functionality re-
liable? 
 
ii. If the fault cannot be located or there are multiple candidates for 
the fault location, how the operator deduces the most potential 
fault location? Describe the data sources utilized. 
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b. Trial switching 
 
i. In what situations trial switchings are not performed?  
 
ii. Which trial switching method is preferred: bi-section or zone-by-
zone rolling?  
 
iii. How is the trial switching method chosen?  
 
c. Supply restoration 
 
i. Are there situations, when operator will not utilize back-feed con-
nections even if calculated constraints are not violated? 
 
ii. If there are multiple acceptable back-feed connections, how the 
operator chooses one to be used? 
 
iii. How normal situation differs from major power disruption accord-
ing to utilizing the back-feed connections? 
 
4. Development needs in DMS system 
a. What are the development needs in current fault location, isolation and 
supply restoration functionalities? 
 
b. What existing or new functionalities do you consider the most important 
for the system?  
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APPENDIX C: REQUIREMENTS FOR THE FLIR 
FUNCTIONALITY ACCORDING TO THE CUS-
TOMER INTERVIEWS 
General functional requirements 
 
1. Automatic Fault Location, Isolation and supply Restoration (FLIR) sequence shall 
not disturb the normal operability of the distribution network: 
a. Performance of the HMI shall be obtained when FLIR is running. 
b. Operator can handle faults when FLIR is running. 
c. Responsibility of a fault can be switched to operator without stopping the 
overall FLIR functionality. 
 
2. DMS600 Workstation user interface must include easy to access kill switch to 
stop automatic sequence in case of a dangerous situation. 
 
3. FLIR must be able to handle simultaneous faults in separate operation areas: 
a. Separate areas prevent FLIR sequences to interrupt each other. 
b. FLIR can be set as responsible of a certain area while operators handle 
rest of the distribution network. 
 
4. FLIR must be stopped due to abnormal situation to avoid electrical safety risk 
a. Switching device indicates abnormal position 
b. Position indication of a switching device is not received 
 
Fault location and isolation 
 
5. Initial data must be used to infer the fault location as the primary method for fault 
location: 
a. Fault distance calculation 
b. Existing fault inference model of the DMS600 
 
6. If an exact fault location cannot be deduced, trial switching sequence shall be 
applied: 
a. Coarse division of the feeder using bi-section method. 
b. Remaining area traversed by zone-by-zone rolling method to avoid un-
necessary tripping. 
 
7. If a secondary fault is found after the first RCD isolation, FLIR should continue 
with zone-by-zone rolling method to isolate the fault.  
 
Supply restoration 
 
8. DMS600 WS checks possible constraint violations before restoring the supply 
a. Loading condition 
b. Voltage drop 
c. Short-circuit protection 
d. Earth fault protection 
97 
 
e. Earth fault current compensation 
f. Parallel operation of primary transformers 
 
9. If healthy upstream branch can be isolated from the main supply route during trial 
switching sequence, supply shall be restored from adjacent feeder 
 
10. Automatic restoration mode shall be disabled from the FLIR settings. E.g. in ma-
jor disturbance situation to: 
a. Prevent outages in adjacent feeder in case of multiple faults 
b. Not potentially interrupt fault handling process of several human opera-
tors 
 
FLIR settings 
 
11. FLIR settings must be easily configurable by the user (e.g. no unnecessary re-
booting of Windows services). 
 
12. Trial switching sequence can be enabled according to time of the day 
 
13. FLIR should have multiple levels of settings. Settings are inherited from upper 
level: 
a. Overall FLIR functionality: 
i. FLIR enabled 
ii. Disturbance mode 
b. Area level: 
i. FLIR enabled 
c. Substation level: 
i. FLIR enabled 
d. Feeder level: 
i. FLIR enabled 
ii. Trial switching sequence enabled 
iii. Can be used as a backup connection 
 
FLIR monitoring 
 
14. Automatic switching actions should be clearly visible in a list to ensure fluent 
switchover from automatic mode to manual. 
 
15. Errors and malfunctions must be highlighted and explained to the user, for exam-
ple: 
a. Error in communication 
b. Switch in abnormal state 
c. Software error (e.g. connection timeout, database error) 
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APPENDIX D: EXAMPLE OF TRIAL SWITCHING 
SEQUENCEWITH SEVERAL FAULT DISTANCE 
CALCULATIONS 
 
1. Fault distance calculated in RCD zones Z11 and Z13 
 
 
2. RCDs in the common branch isolating both suspected zones are opened, and 
substation circuit breaker is closed to supply upstream of the feeder.  
 
 
3. To avoid additional short breaks, branches Z4 - Z5 and Z6 are re-supplied with 
open backup connections and isolated from the main supply route. Feeder can 
be the reduced for zone-by-zone rolling.  
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4. To minimize short breaks, branch Z10 - Z11 is examined first because of the open 
backup connection. Zones Z10 and Z11 are re-supplied one by one from the up-
stream direction. 
 
 
5. If the circuit breaker stays closed, the branch can be stated healthy, and supply 
can be restored from the open backup connection and isolated from the main 
supply route 
 
 
6. Feeder model is further reduced, and the fault is suspected to be in branch Z12 
- Z13.  
 
         
 
7. RCD isolating the zone Z13 is opened and zone Z12 is re-supplied. If the circuit 
breaker stays open, concluded faulty zone is Z13. 
 
        
 
8. There is a chance that fault has disappeared during the isolation sequence. Nor-
mally operator considers verifying the fault by performing additional trial switching 
to the suspected zone. If the circuit breaker still stays open, fault can assume to 
be cleared by itself.  
